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I. INTRODUCTION
C ONGRESS, in the Internal Revenue Code' ("I.R.C." or
"Code"), discriminates against authors, 2 artists, composers,
and other individuals entitled to copyright protection. These tax-
payers are denied the preferential treatment of a deduction for
capital gains 3 which would permit them to deduct from their
gross income sixty percent of the net capital gain 4 resulting from
1. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9602 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2. Throughout this article the terms "author" and "artist" are used inter-
changeably to mean the creator of a work or performance which is entitled to
copyright protection under either copyrights, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. III 1985))
or the common la%. "Author" is the term used in the Constitutional grant of
power to Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For a further discussion of
the broad application of the term "author," see 1 M. B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 1.06[A], n.2 (1986).
3. The deduction for capital gains, as set forth in section 1202 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, provides in pertinent part:
(a) In general-If for any taxable year a taxpayer other than a
corporation has a net capital gain, 60 percent of the amount of the net
capital gain shall be a deduction from gross income.
(c) Transitional Rule-If for any taxable year ending after Octo-
ber 31, 1978, and beginning before November 1, 1979, a taxpayer
other than a corporation has a net capital gain, the deduction under
subsection (a) shall be the sum of-
(1) 60 percent of the lesser of-
(A) the net capital gain for the taxable year, or
(B) the net capital gain taking into account only gain or loss
property taken into account for the portion of the taxa-
ble year after October 31, 1978, plus
(2) 50 percent of the excess of-
(A) the net capital gain for the taxable year, over
(B) the amount of net capital gain taken into account under
paragraph (1).
I.R.C. § 1202 (1982).
4. The term "net capital gain" is defined by the Internal Revenue Code to
be "the excess of the net long-term capital gain for the taxable year over the net
932 [Vol. 3 1: p. 931
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a sale of their works. Authors instead must declare the income
from the sale of their works or performances as ordinary income
and pay the "full tax."' 5 Inventors and patentees, on the other
hand, may take the capital gains deduction upon a sale or ex-
change of their invention.6 Although the works of both inventors
short-term capital loss for such year." I.R.C. § 1222(11) (1982). Section 1222(3)
defines "long-term capital gain" to be "gain from the sale or exchange of a capi-
tal asset held for more than 6 months, if and to the extent such gain is taken into
account in computing gross income." I.R.C. § 1222(3) (Supp. III 1985). Sec-
tion 1222(2) defines short-term capital loss to be "loss from the sale or ex-
change of a capital asset held for not more than 6 months, if and to the extent
that such loss is taken into account in computing taxable income." I.R.C.
§ 1222(2) (Supp. III 1985).
5. Professor Blum defines "full tax" to mean the amount due if all of the
taxpayer's income is taxed as ordinary and none of it qualifies for any deduc-
tions. Blum, The Effects of Special Provisions in the Income Tax on Taxpayer Morale,
Joint Committee on Economic Growth and Stability 251 (1955), reprinted in
READINGS IN FEDERAL TAXATION, 41, 42 (F. Sander and D. Westfall eds. 1970).
6. See I.R.C. § 1235 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This section specifically
provides:
(a) General-A transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or de-
vise) of property consisting of all substantial rights to a patent, or an
undivided interest therein which includes a part of all such rights, by
any holder shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset
held for more than 6 months, regardless of whether or not payments in
consideration of such transfer are-
(1) payable periodically over a period generally coterminous
with the transferee's use of the patent, or
(2) contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the
property transferred.
(b) "Holder" defined.-For purpose of this section, the term
"holder" means-
(1) any individual whose efforts created such property, or
(2) any other individual who has acquired his interest in such
property in exchange for consideration in money or money's worth
paid to such creator prior to actual reduction to practice of the inven-
tion covered by the patent, if such individual is neither-
(A) the employer of such creator, nor
(B) related to such creator (within the meaning of sub-
section (d)).
(c) Effective Date.-This section shall be applicable with regard
to any amounts received, or payments made, pursuant to a transfer de-
scribed in subsection (a) in any taxable year to which this subtitle ap-
plies, regardless of the taxable year in which such transfer occurred.
(d) Related Persons.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to any trans-
fer, directly or indirectly, between persons specified within any one of
the paragraphs of section 267(b) or persons described in section
707(b); except that, in applying section 267(b) and (c) and section
707(b) for purposes of this section-
(1) the phrase "25 percent or more" shall be substituted for
the phrase "more than 50 percent" each place it appears in section
267(b) or 707(b) and
(2) paragraph (4) of section 267(c) shall be treated as provid-
ing that the family of an individual shall include only his spouse, ances-
tors, and lineal descendants.
1986] 933
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and authors are the result of the personal efforts of these persons,
Congress specifically excludes from the definition of a capital as-
set those works of art which are held by "a taxpayer whose personal
efforts created such property," 7 and then, in most contradictory
fashion, specifically states that inventions in the hands of the "in-
dividual whose efforts created such property" are to be given capi-
tal gain treatment.
To fully comprehend the discrimination against authors and
others who are entitled to copyright protection,9 one must first
examine the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that pro-
vide for the preferential treatment of long-term capital gain, and
then decide whether those preferences are justified.
The legislators conferred a preference upon some taxpayers
through the capital gains provisions of the Code. Section 1221
defines the term "capital asset" as property held by the taxpayer
and it then lists specific exclusions from that definition.' 0 Copy-
righted property held by its creator or his donee or benefactor is
specifically excluded."I Because such property is not considered
to be a capital asset, these taxpayers cannot take advantage of sec-
tion 1202 of the Code in order to have the gain resulting from an
exchange of the property characterized as a long-term capital
gain.' 2 Hence, they are denied the benefits of a capital gain de-
duction as allowed by section 1202.
Inventions held by their creators, however, are not excluded
from the definition of capital assets. In fact, in section 1235 of the
Internal Revenue Code,' 3 Congress specifically states that inven-
tions, patents and designs are to be characterized as capital as-
Id.
7. I.R.C. § 1221(3)(A) (1982) (emphasis added). For the complete text of
section 1221, see infra note 28.
8. I.R.C. § 1235(b)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). For the complete text of
section 1235(b)(1), see supra note 6.
9. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
10. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1221(3) (1982). For the full text of section 1221, see
infra note 28.
11. I.R.C. § 1221(3) (1982). For the full text of section 1221(3), see infra
note 28.
12. I.R.C. § 1222(3) (Supp. III 1985). For the text of section 1222(3), see
supra note 4.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 reduced the holding period from one
year to six months plus one day for assets acquired after 6/22/84 and before
1/1/88. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) (codified at I.R.C. § 1222(1)-
(4) (Supp. III 1985)); H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 757, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1445, 1952.
13. For the full text of section 1235, see supra note 6.
934 [Vol. 3 1: p. 931
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sets. 14 Furthermore, under this section, patentees or inventors
receive additional preferential treatment which is denied to other
taxpayers who transfer capital assets. 15
There are other discriminations in the Code which are biased
against authors and artists. For example, section 1231 specifically
excludes copyright property held by its creator from the defini-
tion of trade or business property even though copyrights can be
depreciable property. 16 Also, the author and the artist meet with
great difficulty when either tries to establish that he is carrying on
the trade or business of writing or creating visual art in order to
take advantage of various deductions and other treatment allowed
only to those carrying on a trade or business.' 7
As a counterpoise to the difficulties that artists have, the
Code contains other sections which further benefit inventors and
patentees. Section 174, for example, permits the inventor to de-
duct or amortize his research and experimental expenditures,' 8
14. I.R.C. § 1235(a) (Supp. III 1985). For the full text of section 1235, see
supra note 6.
15. I.R.C. § 1235 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Under section 1235, for exam-
ple, both amatuer and professional inventors realized long-term capital gains. See
generally 3BJ. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.134 (1980 Rev.
Vol.). For a further discussion of this treatment, see infra note 49 and accompa-
nying text.
Also, under section 1235, the traditional section 1222 holding period is not
required in order to realize long-term capital gain. For a further discussion of
this preference, see infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. Finally, under sec-
tion 1235, payments received, whether in the form of a contingent payment or a
periodic payment, are deemed a sale, therefore qualifying under section 1222 as
a sale of a capital asset. Such a transfer amounts to a license under other sec-
tions of the Code. For a further discussion of this preference, see infra note 53
and accompanying text.
16. I.R.C. § 1231(b)(1)(C) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 1231(b)(1)(C)
defines "property used in the trade or business" as:
property used in the trade or business, of a character which is sub-
ject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, held for
more than 6 months, and real property used in the trade or business,
held for more than 6 months, which is not a copyright, a literary, musical, or
artistic composition, a letter or memorandum, or similar property, held by a tax-
payer ....
Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the effect of The Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984 on this holding period, see supra note 12.
17. See generally A. FELD, M. O'HARE, J. SCHUSTER, PATRONS DESPITE THEM-
SELVES: TAXPAYERS AND ARTS POLICY 16 (1983); Lerner, Planning the Collector's
Estate, in REPRESENTING ARTISTS, COLLECTORS, AND DEALERS 17 (1983).
18. I.R.C. § 174(a) (1982). In pertinent part, this section specifically pro-
vides that "[a] taxpayer may treat research or experimental expenditures which
are paid or incurred by him during the taxable year in connection with his trade
or business as expenses which are not chargeable to capital account. The ex-
penditures so treated shall be allowed as a deduction." Id.
1986] 935
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and section 30 provides a credit for these expenditures.1 9 Fur-
thermore, in a patent infringement case, the patentee may treat
the damage payments as payment for the transfer of a capital
asset.20
The legislative histories which accompany the enactment of
these provisions indicate the reasons why Congress has so acted.
These histories manifest a policy of blatant favoritism for small
business and industry.21 In contrast, Congress took "loophole-
closing measures" with respect to any advantages of which the
artist or author may have availed himself.22
These discriminations in the Code are unjustified for several
reasons. First, Congress gets its authority to make laws to benefit
authors and inventors from the same constitutional grant.2 3 Sec-
ond, both patented and copyrighted property are the result of the
personal efforts of their respective creators. And third, upon
close examination, the differences in the treatment to each are
largely due to legislation based on ad hoc reactions to political
and economic events. 24
As a result of the discrepancies in the tax code, the artist
19. I.R.C. § 30 (Supp. III 1985) (renumbering I.R.C. § 44F (1982)). For a
full text of I.R.C. § 30, see infra note 172.
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(c)(1) (1960). This regulation provides:
Payments for Infringement. If section 1235 applies to the transfer of all
substantial rights to a patent (or an undivided interest therein),
amounts received in settlement of, or as the award of damages in, a suit
for compensatory damages for infringement of the patent shall be con-
sidered payments attributable to a transfer to which section 1235 ap-
plies to the extent that such amounts relate to the interest transferred.
For taxable years beginning January 1, 1964, see section 1304, as in
effect before such date, and § 1.1304a- 1 for treatment of compensatory
damages for patent infringement.
Id.
21. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3053, 3221-22; H. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4025, 4026. For a further discus-
sion of Congress' blatant favortism toward small businesses as manifested in the
legislative histories of the tax code, see infra notes 186-95 & 202-13 and accom-
panying text.
22. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3053, 3097. For a further discussion of these "loop-
hole-closing measures," see infra notes 194-219 and accompanying text.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides that: "The Congress shall have
the Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries." Id. For a further discussion of the Constitutional
grant of power, see infra note 246 and accompanying text.
24. See Mott, Authors' Tax Problems-A Summarv of the Provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code, 22 FED. B.J. 148, 150 (1962); Note, A Comparison of the Tax Treatment
of Authors and Inventors, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1423 (1957).
936 [Vol. 31: p. 931
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must resort to contrivances such as the creation of contract
rights 25 or the formation of corporations 26 in hopes of realizing
long-term capital gains. Although these contrivances have
worked for performing artists, it is uncertain whether they will
work for visual artists.2 7
To resolve the inequities of I.R.C. section 1235, Congress
could enact legislation for artists and authors which would be
similar to section 1235 or, alternatively, it could revise section
1235 to include artists. Another resolution could be to provide
long-term capital gain treatment for the artist to the extent of the
appreciation which has occurred while he held his creation. Fi-
nally, Congress could repeal section 1235.
II. CURRENT LAw
A fair analysis of the discrimination against artists, authors,
and other copyright creators can best be made when one fully
understands the tax atmosphere. Therefore, a detailed explana-
tion of the current state of the relevant law ensues.
A. Characterization
1. What is a Capital Asset?
To begin this analysis, one must clarify exactly what consti-
tutes a capital asset. The Internal Revenue Code defines a capital
asset in section 1221 as property held by the taxpayer, whether or
not connected with his trade or business, unless specifically ex-
cluded. 28 Technically, then, all property is a capital asset unless
25. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962); Benny v.
Commissioner, 25 T.C. 197 (1955). For a further discussion of the Fetter case,
see infra notes 87-106, 137-42, 145-46 & 257 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of the Benny case, see infra notes 258-60 and accompanying
text.
26. See, e.g., Estate of Cole, 32 T.C.M. 313 (CCH) (1973); Benny v. Com-
missioner, 25 T.C. 617 (1961). For a further discussion of the Cole case, see infra
notes 264-72 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the Benny case,
see infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
27. For a further discussion of the problems faced by visual artists in at-
tempting to take advantage of contrivances in the hopes of realizing long-term
capital gains, see infra notes 277-80 and accompanying text.
28. I.R.C. § 1221 (1982). This section provides:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means prop-
erty held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or
business), but does not include-
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind
which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on
hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer
7
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the Code states otherwise. 29
Specifically excluded in section 1221(3) from the definition
of a capital asset are copyrights, literary, musical, or artistic com-
positions, letters or memoranda, or "similar property," if these
properties: (1) are held by the taxpayer whose personal efforts
created the property; or (2) in the case of letters or memoranda,
are held by the person for whom they were created; or (3) are
held by a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of the property is
determined by reference to the creator's basis (i.e. gift and like
kind exchanges).30 The Internal Revenue Service ("Service" or
"I.R.S."), in clarifying what is meant by the term "similar prop-
erty," points out in the regulations that this term does not include
a patent for an invention, but rather includes theatrical produc-
tions, radio programs, newspaper cartoon strips, "or any other
property eligible for copyright protection." 3 1
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, or a character which is
subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or
real property used in his trade or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter
or memorandum, or similar property, held by-
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property,
a taxpayer for whom such property was prepared or produced, or
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is
determined, for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange,
in whole or part by reference to the basis of such property in the hands
of a taxpayer described in subparagraph (A) or (B);
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course
of trade or business for services rendered or from the sale of property
described in paragraph (1);
(5) a publication of the United States Government (including the
Congressional Record) which is received from the United States Gov-
ernment or any agency thereof, other than by purchase at the price at
which it is offered for sale to the public, and which is held by-
(A) a taxpayer who so received such publication, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such publication is
determined, for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange,
in whole or in part by reference to the basis of such publication in the
hands of a taxpayer described in subparagraph (A).
Id.
29. The Treasury Regulations repeat this warning. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1221-1(a) (1960). In relevant part, this regulation provides that "[tihe term
'capital assets' includes all classes of property not specifically excluded by sec-
tion 1221." Id.
30. I.R.C. § 1221(3) (1982). For the full text of section 1221(3), see supra
note 28.
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(1), T.D. 7369, 1975-2 C.B. 335, 336. The
regulation specifically provides that:
A copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, and similar
938 [Vol. 31: p. 931
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The Service, in the regulations, also clarifies the term "per-
sonal efforts" as used in section 1221(3).32 A taxpayer creates
property by his personal efforts if he "performs literary, theatri-
cal, musical, artistic, or other creative or productive work which
affirmatively contributes to the creation of the property, or if such
taxpayer directs and guides others in the performance of such
work." 33
Even if there were no specific exclusion in section 1221(3),
copyrights and other similar property still could not be classified
as capital assets if they were held primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business because
of section 1221(1).34 Nor would these assets be considered capi-
tal assets if they were depreciable property used in a trade or
property are excluded from the term "capital assets" if held by a tax-
payer whose personal efforts created such property or if held by a tax-
payer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined, for
purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or in
part by reference to the basis of such property in the hands of a tax-
payer whose personal efforts created such property. For purposes of
this subparagraph, the phrase "similar property" includes for example,
such property as a theatrical production, a radio program, a newspaper
cartoon strip, or any other property eligible for copyright protection
(whether under statute or common law), but does not include a patent
or an invention, or a design which may be protected only under the
patent law and not under the copyright law.
Id.
32. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(3), T.D. 7369, 1975-2 C.B. 335, 336.
33. Id. The regulation specifically provides:
For purposes of this paragraph, in general, property is created in
whole or in part by the personal efforts of a taxpayer if such taxpayer
performs literary, theatrical, musical, artistic, or other creative or pro-
ductive work which affirmatively contributes to the creation of the
property, or if such taxpayer directs and guides others in the perform-
ance of such work. A taxpayer, such as a corporate executive, who
merely has administrative control of writers, actors, artists, or person-
nel and who does not substantially engage in the direction and gui-
dance of such persons in the performance of their work, does not create
property by his personal efforts. However, for purposes of subpara-
graph (2) of this paragraph, a letter or memorandum, or property simi-
lar to a letter or memorandum, which is prepared by personnel who are
under the administrative control of a taxpayer, such as a corporate ex-
ecutive, shall be deemed to have been prepared or produced for him
whether or not such letter, memorandum, or similar property is re-
viewed by him.
Id.
34. I.R.C. § 1221(1) (1982). Section 1221(1) provides that the term "capi-
tal asset" does not include stock in trade or property that would normally be
considered as inventory if on hand at the end of a taxable year or property that is
primarily held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's
business. Id. For the text of section 1221(1), see supra note 28.
19861 939
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Patents and inventions, however, are not specifically ex-
cluded from the definition of a capital asset under section 1221.
And the Service, to obviate any confusion as to legislative intent
to keep these assets within the definition of a capital asset, de-
clares that a patent or an invention is not to be considered "simi-
lar property."3 6 Therefore, an invention will not be excluded
even if it is held by the taxpayer whose personal efforts created it.
The Internal Revenue Code makes it quite clear in section
1235 that individual inventors and their financial backers can ob-
tain long-term capital gain treatment on a transfer of patent
rights.3 7 To qualify under section 1235, the transfer may not be
to a related person, nor may it be by gift or inheritance.38 The
individual must also be the "holder" of the transferred patent
right, thereby precluding the application of section 1235 to cor-
porations.3 9 Congress specifically defines "holder" in this section
to mean one "whose efforts created such property," 40 or his fi-
nancial backers (who are neither his employers nor related to the
creator).4' The Treasury Regulations further define "holder" to
include one who is the " 'original and first' inventor. '42 Ironi-
35. I.R.C. § 1221(2) (1982). Section 1221(2) provides that excluded from
the term "capital asset" is property used in the taxpayer's trade or business
which is subject to the depreciation allowance provided in section 167, or that is
real property. Id.
Normally, when a taxpayer's property is excluded from the capital asset def-
inition under section 1221 because it is depreciable, the taxpayer can alterna-
tively rely on section 1231 in an attempt to have a sale or exchange of the
property recognized as a capital one. Copyrights as described in section
1221(3), however, are specifically excluded from the possible benefits of section
1231. See I.R.C. § 1231 (b)(1)(C) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Here again is another
specific Code discrimination against copyrights which does not apply to patents.
For the full text of section 1221, see supra note 28.
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(1), T.D. 7369, 1975-2 C.B. 335, 336. For the
text of Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(1), see supra note 31.
37. I.R.C. § 1235 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For the full text of section
1235, see supra note 6.
38. I.R.C. §§ 1235(b)(2)(B) (1982), 1235(a) (Supp. III 1985). For the text
of §§ 1235(b)(2)(B) and 1235(a), see supra note 6.
39. I.R.C. §§ 1235(a), 1235(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For the text of
§§ 1235(a) and 1235(b), see supra note 6.
40. I.R.C. § 1235(b)(1) (1982). For the text of§ 1235(b)(1), see supra note
6.
41. I.R.C. § 1235(b)(2) (1982). For the text of § 1235(b)(2), see snpra note
6.
42. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(1)(i) (1960). This regulation provides
that "[t]he term 'holder' means any individual: [w]hose efforts created the pat-
ent property and who would qualify as the 'original and first' inventor, or joint
inventor, within the meaning of title 35 of the United States Code ..... Id.
(emphasis added).
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cally, Congress, in the definition of the term "holder," makes a
blatant contradiction with section 1221. A patent held by the in-
dividual whose efforts created such property is a capital asset under
section 1235, 43 while a copyright held by the taxpayer whose per-
sonal efforts created it is specifically excluded from the definition of
a capital asset in section 1221.44
Furthermore, in the Treasury Regulations the Service ex-
tended the application of section 1235 to inventions, as well as
patents, stating that they also qualify for long-term capital gain
treatment. To take advantage of section 1235, it is not necessary
that a patent or even a patent application be in existence provided
the inventor is able to meet the other requirement of the sec-
tion.45 A transfer of know-how also comes under the rubric of
section 1235.46
Under section 1235, the individual holder must also transfer
43. I.R.C. § 1235(b)(1) (1982). For the full text of § 1235(b)(1), see supra
note 6.
44. I.R.C. § 1221(3)(A) (1982). For the text of§ 1221(3)(A), see supra note
28.
45. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a) (1960). This regulation specifically pro-
vides that:
For the purposes of section 1235 and section 1235-1: Patent. The
term "patent" means a patent granted under the provisions of title 35
of the United States Code, or any foreign patent granting rights gener-
ally similar to those under a United States patent. It is not necessary
that the patent or patent application for the invention be in existence if
the requirements of section 1235 are otherwise met.
Id.
46. See Morreale, Patents, Know-How and Trademarks: A Tax Overview, 29 TAx
LAW. 553 (1976). Mr. Morreale defines the term "Know-how" to refer "to any
compilation of information used in a business that gives the user an opportunity
to gain an advantage over competitors who do not know about or use such infor-
mation." Id. at 564. Mr. Morreale argues that
[s]ales of know-how will produce capital gains as long as the know-how
constitutes property and is a capital asset in the hands of the seller.
The apparent Service position is that only know-how that is secret and
protectible against disclosure, at least in significant part, can qualify as
"property" within the meaning of section 1221. The courts, however,
ordinarily take a less restrictive view of whether know-how constitutes
property, and it would appear that know-how need not necessarily be a
trade secret in order to qualify as property. For example, a valuable
process known only to a few companies in a large industry should be
treated as property, as should an indexed compilation of technical in-
formation relating to a process known by several companies. Finally, in
a combined transfer of patents and know-how, the know-how may be so
incidental or ancillary to the patent as to be deemed to have taken on
the "property" character of the transferred patent.
Id. at 565 (footnotes omitted); see also Cohen, Capital Gains and the Sale of Know-
How, 60 TAXES 601 (1982); Harding, Obtaining Capital Gains Treatment on Transfers
of Know-How, 37 TAX LAW. 307 (1984).
11
Cantor: Tax Policy: Copyrights and Patents
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
942 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31: p. 931
"all substantial rights" to the patent or invention.47 The Regula-
tions cite factors which are to be considered in determining
whether all substantial rights have been transferred. 48 A mere
licensing of patent rights will not qualify under this section.
It is unimportant, under section 1235, whether the inventor
is a professional or an amateur.49 And it is also immaterial
47. I.R.C. § 1235(a) (Supp. III 1985). For the text of § 1235(a), see supra
note 6.
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b), T.D. 6852, 1965-2 C.B. 289, 290 provides:
All substantial rights to a patent. (1) The term "all substantial
rights to a patent" means all rights (whether or not then held by the
grantor) which are of value at the time the rights to the patent (or an
undivided interest therein) are transferred. The term "all substantial
rights to a patent" does not include a grant of rights to a patent:
(i) Which is limited geographically within the country of
issuance;
(ii) Which is limited in duration by the terms of the agree-
ment to a patent less than the remaining life of the patent;
(iii) Which grants rights to the grantee, in fields of use within
trades or industries, which are less than all the rights covered by the
patent, which exist and have value at the time of the grant; or
(iv) Which grants to the grantee less than all the claims or
inventions covered by the patent which exist and have value at the time
of the grant. The circumstances of the whole transaction, rather than
the particular terminology used in the instrument of transfer, shall be
considered in determining whether or not all substantial rights to a pat-
ent are transferred in a transaction.
(2) Rights which are not considered substantial for purposes of
section 1235 may be retained by the holder. Examples of such rights
are:
(i) The retention by the transferor of legal title for the pur-
pose of securing performance or payment by the transferee in a trans-
action involving transfer of an exclusive license to manufacture, use,
and sell for the life of the patent;
(ii) The retention by the transferor of rights in the property
which are not inconsistent with the passage of ownership, such as the
retention of a security interest (such as a vendor's lien), or a reservation
in the nature of a condition subsequent (such as a provision for forfei-
ture on account of nonperformance).
(3) Examples of rights which may or may not be substantial, de-
pending upon the circumstances of the whole transaction in which
rights to a patent are transferred, are:
(i) The retention by the transferor of an absolute right to
prohibit sublicensing or subassignment by the tranferee;
(ii) The failure to convey to the transferee the right to use or
to sell the patent property.
(4) The retention of a right to terminate the transfer at will is the
retention of a substantial right for the purposes of section 1235.
Id. For a discussion of the restrictions on patent licensing, see generally Morre-
ale, supra note 46, at 558-60.
49. According to section 1235, capital gains tax treatment is available to
any transfer of property made by a "holder." A holder is defined as "al' inldivid-
ual whose efforts created such property," or "any other individual who has ac-
quired his interest in such property in exchange for consideration . '..." I.R.C.
12
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whether the taxpayer is holding his patent or invention for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business. 50
Furthermore, under section 1235, there is no holding period
requirement for the individual holder to receive long-term capital
gain treatment. The section states that a transfer of all substantial
rights to a patent "by any holder shall be considered the sale or
exchange of a capital asset held for more than six months." 5' As
such, an inventor enjoys greater preferences under the Code than
an ordinary investor who must meet the "more than six months"
holding period requirement of I.R.C. section 1222(3) for assets
acquired after June 22, 1984 and before January 1, 1988 in order
to realize long-term capital gain. 52
Section 1235 also states that the transfer of a patent or inven-
tion shall be considered a sale or exchange "regardless of
whether or not payments are ... payable periodically ... or con-
tingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the property
transferred." 53 Once again, the inventor enjoys a greater prefer-
ence than an ordinary taxpayer because an ordinary taxpayer who
receives contingent or periodic payments for his capital asset is
usually not able to meet the "sale" requirement of I.R.C. section
1222 if the asset itself does not pass to the payor.
As if Congress has not given inventors enough of an incen-
tive with the enactment of I.R.C. section 1235, the Service, in the
Treasury Regulation to that section, has also stated that any dam-
age payments awarded for patent infringement "shall be consid-
ered payments attributable to a transfer to which section 1235
applies." 54
Finally, section 1235 is non-exclusive. The regulations state
that if section 1235 does not apply, e.g., because the transfer is to
§ 1235(b) (1982) (emphasis added). For the full text of section 1235(b), see
supra note 6. See also 3BJ. MERTENS, supra note 15, at 918 (with respect to capital
gain treatment in favor of a holder of patent or invention, unimportant whether
taxpayer is professional or amateur inventor, or whether taxpayer holds the pat-
ent or invention for sale to customers in ordinary course of trade or business).
50. Section 1235 contains no language regarding the purpose for which the
taxpayer holds the patent. For the full text of section 1235, see supra note 6. See
also 3BJ. MERTENS, supra note 15, at 918.
51. I.R.C. § 1235(a) (Supp. III 1985). For the full text of section 1235(a),
see supra note 6.
52. I.R.C. § 1222(3) (Supp. III 1985); see H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 757, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1445, 1952.
53. I.R.C. § 1235(a) (Supp. III 1985). For the full text of section 1235(a),
see supra note 6.
54. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(c)(1) (1960). For the text of Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1235-1(c)(1), see supra note 20.
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a related person, then the tax consequences of the transfer are to
be governed by the other provisions of the Code. 55 The Service
reiterated this point in Revenue Ruling 69-482, stating that if sec-
tion 1235 does not apply, a taxpayer may still be able to get long-
term capital gain treatment under the other provisions in the
Code.56 For example, since patents are depreciable assets, sec-
tion 1231 could apply to characterize the transaction as long-term
capital gain. However, if the taxpayer fails to meet the require-
ments of section 1235 and resorts instead to section 1231 for cap-
ital gain characterization, he must still meet the requirements of
section 1231.5
7
After I.R.C. section 1235 was passed in 1954, Revenue Rul-
ing 55-58 was issued which failed to give the section retroactive
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235- 1(b) (1960). This regulation pertains to the scope
of I.R.C. § 1235 and provides:
If a transfer is not one described in paragraph (a) of this section, sec-
tion 1235 shall be disregarded in determining whether or not such
transfer is the sale or exchange of a capital asset. For example, a trans-
fer by a person other than a holder or a transfer by a holder to a related
person is not governed by section 1235. The tax consequences of such
transfers shall be determined under other provisions of the internal
revenue laws.
Id.
56. Rev. Rul. 69-482, 1969-2 C.B. 164. In this ruling, the taxpayer, who
was a "holder" as that term is defined in section 1235(b) of the Code, trans-
ferred all substantial rights in a patent to a corporation in which he owned one-
third of the outstanding stock. The corporation was making payments for the
patent as provided by section 1235 of the Code. In the hands of the taxpayer,
the patent was a capital asset.
Reasoning that the transfer in question was to a corporation that is a related
person within the meaning of section 1235(d), the I.R.S. determined that the
transaction did not meet the requirements of section 1235 and, therefore, was
not eligible for long-term capital gains treatment.
The I.R.S. further stated, however, that the taxpayer was "entitled to treat
the transfer of all substantial rights in the patent as the sale or exchange of a
capital asset and the gain therefrom is reportable as long-term capital gain." Id.
at 165. The Service's rationale for this holding was that "the mere fact that a
patent transfer by a holder for contingent amounts does not qualify for long-
term capital gains treatment under section 1235 of the Code, will not prevent it
from qualifying for such treatment under other provisions of the Code if it
would qualify for such treatment in the absence of section 1235." Id.
57. See D. POSIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 244-45 (1983);
see also 7 FED. TAXES (P-H) 32,105 (1986), which states in relevant part that
[u]nder Sec. 1235 .... individual inventors and certain other indi-
vidual holders of patents can obtain long-term capital gain for patent
right transfers that qualify under that provision .... If Sec. 1235 rules
don't apply, the patent rights must be capital assets (in general, held for
investment) or Sec. 1231 assets (in general, depreciable property used
in business and held for the long-term period . . .) and their transfer
must qualify as a sale or exchange, to produce capital or Sec. 1231 gain
or loss.
[Vol. 3 1: p. 931
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effect to May 31, 1950.58 The Tax Court, however, has liberally
construed section 1235.59
2. Other Factors Which Determine Characterization
The question of why Congress gave patentees and inventors
such preferential treatment has been raised by many scholars of
the Internal Revenue Code.60 A discussion of the legislative his-
tories of the pertinent code sections suggests some possible theo-
ries. However, before those histories are presented, other
relevant factors that may determine characterization must first be
discussed.
Transfer of a Property Right
The taxpayer must transfer an item that amounts to a prop-
erty right if it is to be considered a capital asset transfer. Certain
items that represent rights to future income are not treated as
capital assets and the payment which a taxpayer receives for them
may be considered either wholly or partially as compensation for
services, instead of proceeds from the sale of a capital asset. 61
58. Rev. Rul. 55-58, 1955-1 C.B. 97. This ruling dealt with the issue of
what treatment will be given to amounts received by investors from the assign-
ment of patents, or the exclusive right to make, use and sell patented articles
under license agreements, where such amounts are not subject to section 1235.
Id. The Service ruled that:
Although section 1235 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 spe-
cifically provides that, with specified exceptions, such payments re-
ceived in 1954 and subsequent years will receive capital gains treatment
in the hands of the inventor, this provision of the 1954 Code is applica-
ble only to amounts received in taxable years beginning after December
31, 1953, and therefore does not apply to amounts received in taxable
years beginning after May 31, 1950, and before January 1, 1954.
Accordingly, except as section 1235 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 applies, the Internal Revenue Service will continue to treat as
ordinary income the payments received by inventors during taxable
years beginning May 31, 1950, from such transfers.
Id.
59. See Rouverol v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 186 (1964). In Rouverol, a tax-
payer had entered into a written agreement in which he granted to a firm " 'an
exclusive right and license, with right to sublicense...' " a transmission which
he had invented and patented. Id. at 187. The firm granted further licenses to
another firm. Id. at 189. The court held that the income received for the trans-
fers was taxable as long-term capital gain rather than as ordinary income. Id. at
194.
60. See generally Eulenberg, Books and Mousetraps, 54 A.B.A. J. 1173 (1968);
Pilpel, Development in the Tax Law Affecting Copyrights in 1954, 33 TAXEs 271 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Development in the Tax Law]; Pilpel, Tax Lau, Affecting Copy-
rights: 1954-56, 35 TAXES 76 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Tax Law]; Note, supra
note 24.
61. 7 FED. TAXES (P-H) 32,091 (1984). Courts have used three factors to
1986] 945
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The courts often use assignment of income principles62 to deny
capital gain treatment to a particular transaction because it is not
a transfer of a property right but rather a transfer of a right to
future income. 63 In the copyright area, these principles are often
determine the capital (or ordinary) character of gain or loss from a transaction.
First, a sale of an entire business for a single price (i.e. a sale of all the going
concern assets of a business as distinguished from the sale of the stock of a cor-
poration that operates it) is treated as a separate sale of assets and the taxpayer
may have a part capital gain or loss and a part ordinary gain or loss on the
transaction. Second, property that would be a capital asset may be treated as an
ordinary asset if bought solely in connection with a business (e.g. stock of a sup-
plier concern). And third, certain items transferred are not capital assets but
rather ordinary income. These transferred items represent rights to future in-
come, the payments of which are treated as compensation for services. For ex-
amples of transfers treated as rights to future income and therefore ordinary
income, see, e.g., Bellamy v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 487 (1965) (actor had ordi-
nary income on sale of contract right to distribute and show films; investment in
films was only a service); Bessie Lasky v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 13 (1954) (as-
signment of right to receive motion picture royalties results in ordinary income),
petition for review dismissed, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 302 U.S.
1027 (1957); McFall v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 108 (1936) (employee had or-
dinary income on "sale" of employment contract to third party acting under
agreement with employer).
62. Assignment of income involves the transfer of income from one tax-
payer to another before that income is received. The assignment of income doc-
trine dictates that where the right to receive income is transferred to another
person in a transaction which does not give rise to a tax at the time of the trans-
fer, the transfer is taxed on the income when it is collected by the transferee. See
D. POSIN, supra note 57, at 266-82. There are two types of such assignments.
Gratuitous assignments involve situations where a cash method taxpayer who is
owed compensation for personal services he has rendered attempts to assign the
payment of that compensation to a family member. Id. at 266.
This was the case in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), when a taxpayer
agreed by contract to assign his wife one-half of all his future earnings. Id. at
113-14. The taxpayer argued that although he earned the income, his wife
should be taxed on the half assigned to her. Id. at 114. The purpose of such
assignments are to decrease the tax on the overall family unit because the donee
will be in a lower tax bracket than the donor. See D. PosIN, supra note 57, at 266.
However, the Supreme Court held that salaries should be taxed to those who
earn them and the wage-earner cannot escape this tax by an anticipatory con-
tract which provides that the salary be paid to someone else. Lucas, 281 U.S. at
114-15.
Assignments for consideration spring from "an urge to enjoy capital gains
[tax] treatment on what would otherwise be ordinary income." D. POSIN, supra
note 57, at 267. A major case in this area is Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28
(1941), in which a lessor received a lump sum payment from the lessee in ex-
change for the cancellation of the lease. Id. at 29. While the payment to the
lessor was $140,000, the lessor reported a loss of income on the theory that the
$140,000 was still less than he would have received as fair rent. Id. The
Supreme Court held that the $140,000 was ordinary income since it was a substi-
tute for rent. Id. at 31. For a discussion of the direction the Court has taken
since Hort, see D. PosIN, supra note 57, at 270-73.
63. Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of Income-the Ferrer
Case, 20 TAX. L. REV. 1, 22 (1964). In his article, Professor Eustice discusses
court decisions involving the transfer of various contract rights, whether by sale
946 [Vol. 3 1: p. 931
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asserted against transferors of copyrighted property. Assignment
of income principles are not used in the patent context because a
patent transfer in exchange for contingent payments (i.e., pay-
ments based on future use or productivity) is specifically deemed
to be a "sale" under I.R.C. section 1235.64 However, Revenue
Ruling 60-226 states that due to the similarities between copy-
rights and patents, a copyright transfer of exclusive rights in ex-
change for royalty payments is also to be treated as a sale. 65 In
the case of a patent, the item transferred will amount to a future
income right only if substantial rights are retained by its creator.66
A transfer of know-how may be considered a transfer of a
property right. Know-how is unpatented technical knowledge or
information. 67 The Service, in Revenue Ruling 64-56, adopted a
or by cancellation, where courts have tested capital gain status under assignment
of income principles rather than resorting to other theories such as lack of
"sale." Id. Under assignment of income principles, the courts have issued con-
flicting decisions concerning capital asset status of contract cancellation and
sales. Id. at 23; see, e.g., General Guaranty Mortgage Co. v. Tomlinson, 335 F.2d
518 (5th Cir. 1964) (part capital gain, part ordinary income); Hyatt v. Commis-
sioner, 325 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1963) (ordinary income), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832
(1964); United States v. Dresser Indus., 324 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963) (capital
gain).
64. See I.R.C. § 1235(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985). For the text of section 1235,
see supra note 6.
65. Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26. In Revenue Ruling 60-226, the Ser-
vice held "that the consideration received by a proprietor of a copyright for a
grant transferring the exclusive right to exploit the copyrighted work . . .
throughout the life of the copyright shall be treated as proceeds from a sale of
property .. " Id. at 27. The Service stated that this treatment should be given
"regardless of whether the consideration received is measured by a percentage
of the receipts from the sale, performance, exhibition, or publication of the
copyrighted work," or by the number of copies sold or performances given of
the copyrighted work. Id.
Revenue Ruling 60-226 modified Revenue Ruling 54-409 which had denied
treatment as a sale of property to a copyright where the transfer of the exclusive
right to exploit is measured by the publication, use, or sale of the copyrighted
work. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 54-409, 1954-2 C.B. 174).
Revenue Ruling 60-226 adopted a contrary position because it viewed prop-
erty rights of patents and copyrights as similar in substance, and, therefore, sub-
ject to the same tax treatment. Rev. Rul. 60-226 at 27. The Service, in reaching
its decision, however, stated that "whether a copyright is a capital asset within
the meaning of section 1221 of the Code and when the provisions of section
1302 of the Code with respect to copyrights would apply are separate and dis-
tinct questions which are not considered in this ruling." Id.
66. See I.R.C. § 1235(a) (Supp. III 1985). For the full text of section
1235(a), see supra note 6.
67. See Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. United States, 591 F.2d 652, 665
(Ct. Cl. 1979); United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 961 (1965); Heil Co. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 989 (1962); Rev. Rul.
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test to determine whether know-how that is transferred is a prop-
erty right or a right to future income. The test focuses on resem-
blance to a patentable invention, although patentability is not
necessary. 68 The United States Court of Claims has specifically
held that a secret process is property. 69
In the copyright area, when an artist transfers a copyright,
the Service could easily characterize the transfer as a transfer of a
right to receive future income and, therefore, under assignment
of income principles, tax the gain to the transferor as ordinary
68. Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, 134. Revenue Ruling 64-56 ad-
dressed the issue of whether technical "know-how" constitutes property which
can be transferred in exchange for stock or securities under section 351 of the
Code, without recognition of gain or loss. Id. at 133. Section 351 of the Code
states that, generally, "[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized if property is trans-
ferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or
securities in such corporation and [if] immediately after the exchange such per-
son or persons are in control . . . of the corporation." I.R.C. § 351(a) (1982).
The issue regarding the resulting tax consequences arose when a domestic
manufacturer agreed to assist a newly organized foreign corporation in making
and selling abroad the same kind of product that it made. Rev. Rul. 64-56 at
133. The transferor (the manufacturer) typically granted the transferee (the
newly organized corporation) the right to use manufacturing processes which, as
patents, are the exclusive rights of the transferor and furnish ongoing technical
assistance in the operation of the plant. Id. The transferor's consideration in
part typically contained what is commonly called "know-how" in exchange for
substantially all the stock of the transferee. Id.
The ruling stated that under section 351, property would include "secret
processes and formulas. . . in the general nature of patentable invention .. "
Id. at 134. The Service also stated that "[w]here the transferor agrees to per-
form services in connection with a transfer of property, tax free treatment will be
accorded if the services are merely ancillary and subsidiary to the property trans-
fer." Id. This determination is a question of fact. Id.; see also United States Min-
eral Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 177, 196-98 (1969); Heil Co. v.
Commissioner, 38 T.C. 989, 1003 (1962).
69. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl.
1961). In Du Pont, the Du Pont company developed a chemical process which
was at first thought to be non-patentable and was kept a secret. Id. at 909. Du
Pont sold the blueprints of the process to another company in exchange for
$225,000. Id. at 910. The buyer agreed to keep the process secret for five years,
but Du Pont retained the right to disclose the process to others. Id. Du Pont
claimed that the sale of the process was property subject to capital gains treat-
ment. Id.
The court, however, denied capital gains treatment to the transfer, pointing
out that in order for a secret process to be treated as a sale of property, the
owner of the trade secret must transfer not only the right to use the secret, but
also the right to prevent unauthorized disclosure. Id. at 912. Du Pont had failed
to meet this requirement because it retained the right to make future disclosures
of the process. Id. The court required prevention of future disclosures because
a trade secret derives its value from the fact of its secrecy. Id. at 911. No dispo-
sition of a trade secret would be complete without some transfer of the right to
prevent unauthorized disclosure. Id.; see also Hooker Chems. & Plastic Corp. v.
United States, 591 F.2d 652, 665 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (sale of patent rights and know-
how held sale of property entitled to capital gains treatment).
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income. Artists, therefore, are often forced to rely on a transfer
of contract rights argument in an attempt to achieve capital gains
treatment for their exchanges.
There are several cases holding that an artist's transfer of
contract rights to receive future income does constitute a transfer
of a property right. In Lewis v. Rothensies,70 for example, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania in 1944 stated that "[w]hen an author writes a book the
literary ideas embodied in the manuscript are property."' 7 1 When
the author "sells the manuscript in exchange for royalties his in-
terest in the contract by which the royalties are paid is prop-
erty." 72 The court, therefore, implicitly recognized a contract
right as property.
Five years later, in Wodehouse v. Commissioner,73 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted a similar
approach, holding that an assignment of an interest in an author's
unpublished manuscript would be effective to shift the tax burden
to the taxpayer's donee.74 In Wodehouse, the gift was made before
the property was producing any income. 75
Then, in 1956, the United States Court of Appeals for the
70. Lewis v. Rothensies, 61 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1944), aff'd per curiam,
150 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1945).
71. 61 F. Supp. at 862. In Lewis, the taxpayer, an author under contract
with his publisher to receive royalties, assigned the contracts to his children. Id.
at 862. The court held that the royalties were taxable to the taxpayer, regardless
of whether the royalties were income derived from personal services or from
income-producing property. Id. at 863. In dicta, however, the court stated that
the royalties were income from income-producing property, because royalties
are derived from the sale of a written work. Id. at 862.
72. Id. When he sells the book, the author's interest in the contract by
which royalties are paid is his property. Id. The court noted that the book was
property even though it came into being by the taxpayer's own personal serv-
ices. Id.
73. Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1949).
74. Id. at 884-85. In Wodehouse, the taxpayer executed an assignment to his
wife of an undivided one-half interest in an unpublished story. Id. at 882. The
one-half interest was incorporated in the contracts regarding the sale of any
rights to the story. Id. The story was later sold and royalties were received by
the taxpayer and his wife (half each respectively). Id. The Tax Court, however,
found that the assignment of the one-half interest was not a bona fide gift, and
consequently charged all the royalties to the gross income of the taxpayer. The
Second Circuit reversed the decision and remanded, stating that the Tax Court
had failed to show sufficient evidence that the transfer was not a bona fide gift.
Id. at 884-85.
75. Id. at 882. The Second Circuit noted that the taxpayer had "no contract
right to [the] royalties when he made the gift." Id. at 881. He assigned property
(the one-half interest in the story) to his wife and the income which the wife
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First Circuit held in Commissioner v. Reece76 that a royalty contract
itself was income-producing property which may be transferred to
shift income. In Reece, the taxpayer assigned his invention to a
corporation in exchange for a contract to receive royalties. 77 A
few years later, he made an irrevocable assignment of the contract
to his wife and paid the gift tax. 78 The corporation assented to
the transfer and paid the royalties to the wife.79 Reasoning that
this transaction was a novation and that the assignment was a
valid transfer of property rights as opposed to a mere transfer of
rights to receive future income, the court found that the royalty
payments were taxable to the wife.80 The court considered
Reece's complete divestiture of control over the item transferred
as an important factor in deciding that the transferred contract
right amounted to property.81
76. Commissioner v. Reece, 233 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1956).
77. Id. at 30-31.
78. Id. at 31. The assignment provided as follows:
Know All Men By These Presents:
That I, Franklin A. Reece, of Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, in con-
sideration of love and affection, hereby assign and transfer to my wife,
Marie Teresa Reece, her executors, administrators and assigns, my roy-
alty contract with the Universal Winding Company as set forth in its
letter to me dated February 5, 1929, covering my invention, together
with all my right, title and interest in and to payments now due or here-
after to become payable to me by said Company thereunder; the said
contract to be held by my said wife for her own use and behoof as fully
and entirely as the same would have been held by me had this assign-
ment not been made.
Executed this 26 day of December, 1935.
(s) Franklin A. Reece (S)
In the presence of:
(s) J.W. Nichols
Universal Winding Company hereby consents and agrees to the
above assignments and acknowledges receipt of notice thereof, this * *
day of December, 1935.
Universal Winding Company
By (s) Robert A. Leeson
President
Id.
79. Id. The court found that these payments were made solely for the wife's
use and benefit and were not subject to any control by the taxpayer. Id.
80. Id. at 31, 35. The court noted that upon the sale of his patent rights,
the taxpayer had received "a new kind of property interest, a chose in action, a
contract right . . . . No doubt this contract right . . . was property of the tax-
payer . . . . Id. at 33.
81. Id. at 33-35; see also Shine, Some Tax Problems of Authors and Artists, 13 TAX
L. REV. 439 (1958). The Shine article discusses whether an assignment of an
interest in a royalty contract itself, rather than the assignment of the right to
receive royalties, would shift the burden to the assignee. Id. at 454. After ana-
lyzing the Reece case, Mr. Shine suggests that assignment of income rules where
income is derived from salary, wages, or compensation for personal services do
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In reviewing these cases, one must remember that the courts
dealt with the issue of the transfer of a property right in the con-
text of the shifting of income. Once the property is sold by the
donee, however, the legislators of I.R.C. section 1221 have as-
sured that a gift of copyrighted property will produce ordinary in-
come for the donee.8 2 There is a congressional assumption that
the artist realizes no income on the donative transfer and that the
income realized on the donee's subsequent transfer will be taxed
to the donee.8 3 The Service, in Revenue Ruling 54-599, has
stated that the income can be shifted to the donee provided there
is a complete divestiture of control over the property interest
transferred.8 4
not apply to the assignment of a royalty contract which is a property right itself.
Id. at 456 (citing Reece, 233 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1956)). The donor could, through a
gift, divest himself of all control over the property right, thereby shifting all inci-
dents of ownership to the donee. Shine, supra, at 456.
82. See I.R.C. § 1221(3)(C) (1982). For the full text of section 1221(3)(C),
see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Farrier v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 277 (1950) (donor did not
realize taxable gain income on gift of cattle to donee); S. REP. No. 2375, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3053,
3097; see also Beghe, The Artist, the Art Market and the Income Tax, 29 TAx L. REV.
491, 505 (1974). Mr. Beghe discusses the treatment of a gift of copyrighted
property by the use of the following example. Id. at 504. An artist paints a
painting at a production cost of $100. Upon completion, the painting has a
value of $1,000. Id. Instead of selling it, he holds it until the value has reached
$10,000. Id. He either dies while still holding the piece, gives it to a family
member or donates it to a museum. Id. The transferee later sells the painting
for $100,000. Id. at 505.
The article suggests that under § 1221(3)(C), the sale of the artist's work
will be ordinary income. Id. This result reflects the congressional assumption
"that the artist realizes no income on the donative transfer and that the income
realized on the donee's subsequent sale of the work will be attributed to the
donee rather than the donor." Id. (footnote omitted).
Mr. Beghe finds justification for this congressional assumption in light of
the commissioner's concession after the Wodehouse case, "that a gift of the exclu-
sive rights to a copyright in one medium would shift the income on realization to
the donee, provided there was a complete divestiture of control over the prop-
erty interest transferred." Id. Also, later cases held "that where the property
was the product of the donor's personal efforts (rather than personal services
rendered to another) the creator would not be taxed on the income realized
when the donee subsequently sold or otherwise disposed of an interest in the
property." Id. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Reece, 233 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1956).
Mr. Beghe states that the law recognizing an all or nothing approach by
requiring that the gross income on the sale or disposition of a gift be taxed in its
entirety to either the donor or the donee is an obstacle to arriving at a theoreti-
cally satisfying conclusion. Beghe, supra, at 506. The article suggests that there
should be an apportionment between the production of income and the sale
income. Id. For a further discussion of Wodehouse, see supra notes 73-75 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of Reece, see supra notes 76-81 and
accompanying text.
84. Rev. Rul. 54-599, 1954-2 C.B. 52. Revenue Ruling 54-599 was issued
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Furthermore, a recent Private Ruling 85 reaffirms the position
of the Service on the issue of an assignment of a royalty contract
as a valid assignment of property rights that is effective to shift
income. In that Ruling, the Service considered the transfer in
trust of a royalty contract with respect to a book that has already
been written. The Service reasoned that the literary ideas embod-
ied in the manuscript were property. When the author sells the
book to a publisher, he receives in exchange a contract right to
receive royalties, and that contract right is itself income-produc-
ing property. Here, the entire tree (property right) was trans-
ferred with the result that the assignment of income doctrine did
not make the author taxable on the royalties which would be paid
in the future to the trust.8 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in Commissioner v. Ferrer,87 addressed the issue of whether a prop-
erty right or an income right is transferred in the context of copy-
in response to Revenue Ruling 54-409 which held that copyrights are divided
into separate properties and that a grant of the exclusive right to exploit a copy-
righted work in a specific medium, such as radio, television, movies, or the stage,
throughout the life of the copyright, transfers a property right. Rev. Rul. 54-
409, 1954-2 C.B. 174. Revenue Ruling 54-599 held that where a taxpayer trans-
fers by gift all his rights in the dramatization of his novel for its production in a
specific medium, he is not liable for federal income tax with respect to any in-
come derived from his former interest in the right to dramatization. Rev. Rul.
54-599, 1954-2 C.B. 52. Rather, any income from such dramatization rights
would be taxable to the donee. Id. For a further discussion of Revenue Ruling
54-409, see infra note 122.
85. Private Ruling 8217037 (Internal Revenue ServiceJan. 27, 1982) (avail-
able on Lexis, Fed. Tax Library, P.R. file).
86. The Private Ruling was in response to a letter from a taxpayer who
wrote a non-fiction book and entered into a royalty contract with a publisher for
the payment of a royalty based on sales of the book. The taxpayer gave the
publisher the exclusive right to print, publish and sell the book. The publisher
agreed to pay royalties on the copies sold.
The taxpayer then transferred a royalty contract into two separate trusts
created for the benefit of two minor children. The specific issue posed to the
Internal Revenue Service was whether the royalties paid under the royalty con-
tract after the transfer would be taxable to the trust and/or their respective
beneficiaries.
The Service held that the transfer was a gift of income-producing property.
It adopted the reasoning of Lewis v. Rothensies, 61 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa.
1944), aff'dper curiam, 150 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1945), which found that the literary
ideas embodied in a manuscript were property. When the author sells the book
in exchange for royalties, the royalties are derived from income-producing prop-
erty. For a discussion of Lewis, see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
Therefore, the transfer of the royalty contract interests to the trusts were a
transfer of income-producing property. Any royalties received after the transfer
of the contract right to the trust would be taxed to the trust. See also Cutrow,
Estate Planning for the Artist, in REPRESENTING ARTISTS, COLLECTORS AND DEALERS
347 (1983).
87. Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
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righted property. Because Ferrer is a performing artist, this case
is of special significance to the topic of copyrights.
At common law, a performing artist generally has a copyright
in his performance if the performance is not fixed (i.e., not filmed
or recorded).88 Once fixed, his copyright in his performance is
protected by federal statute.8 9 The Treasury Regulations of the
Internal Revenue Service state that the term "similar property" in
I.R.C. section 1221(3), which denies capital treatment to copy-
righted property, includes a theatrical production and "any other
property eligible for copyright protection (whether under statute
or common law)." 90 Further, as a performing artist, if payments
received are for future services, then the amount received in the
transfer will be ordinary income either under I.R.C. section 61 as
compensation, or under the assignment of income doctrine. Fi-
nally, if the item transferred is a property right entitled to copy-
right protection and held by its creator, then I.R.C. section
1221(3) will deny it capital gain treatment.
88. See 1 M. B. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.02 (1986). Unpublished works are
automatically protected by state law. This protection begins at the moment of
creation and terminates upon publication, when the common law copyright is
lost. Id. The common law protection covers any work which is not fixed in a
tangible form of expression such as choreography that has never been filmed or
notated, an extemporaneous speech, original works of authorship communi-
cated solely through conversations or live broadcasts, and dramatic sketches or
musical compositions improvised or developed from memory without being re-
corded or written down. Id.
89. The Federal statute that protects copyrights in such performances is 17
U.S.C. § 102 (1982). Section 102 provides:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following
categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
Id.
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(1), T.D. 7369, 1975-2 C.B. 335, 336. For a
discussion of Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(l), see supra note 31 and accompanying
text.
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In Commissioner v. Ferrer,9' Jose Ferrer showed that he stood in
a different relationship to the copyrighted property transferred
because he himself did not create it.92 Ferrer is significant because
the court was willing to splinter the rights transferred, finding
that two were property rights and the third was for compensa-
tion.93 The pertinent facts in the Ferrer decision are as follows:
Jose Ferrer acquired the exclusive dramatic production rights in a
play based on a novel written by LaMure.94 The author reserved
full equitable and legal title to the copyrighted play,95 although
Ferrer had the power to block the author's transfer of retained
film rights.96 Ferrer was granted a lease of the exclusive theatrical
production rights.97 If the author sold the play with Ferrer's con-
sent, Ferrer would get a contingent royalty interest in the consid-
eration received. 98
Before the play was produced, a film company bought the
film rights from the author.99 The film company had Ferrer sign a
release of his rights and also hired him to star in the film.' 00 Fer-
rer was to receive a stipulated salary for his acting services.' 0 ' For
the release of his rights, he received a seventeen percent interest
in the net profits of the film. 10 2 The amount that Ferrer received
91. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
92. Id. at 132.
93. Ferrer, 304 F.2d at 134-35. For a discussion of the significance of the
court's holding, see infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
94. Ferrer, 304 F.2d at 126-27. The contract provided that LaMure "leased"
to Ferrer "the sole and exclusive right" to produce and present the play on stage
in the United States and Canada. Id. at 127.
95. Id. The contract, however, excepted from LaMure's retained rights the
right to produce the play. Id. In addition, the Motion Picture Negotiator was
given the power to dispose of the motion picture rights but only upon the writ-
ten consent of both LaMure and Ferrer. Id.
96. Id. This provision protected Ferrer from dilution of the value of his
right to produce the play due to its premature exposure as a motion picture.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 128. LaMure sold the rights on the strength of Ferrer's assur-
ances that he would be willing to abandon the theatrical production in exchange
for compensation upon successful film production. Id.
100. Id. LaMure's lawyer prepared the release. Id. Ferrer signed the
agreement but advised his attorney not to deliver it until the closing of his con-
tract with the motion picture production company. Id. This contract was exe-
cuted on May 7, 1952 and the release was subsequently delivered on May 14. Id.
101. Id. Ferrer was to receive $50,000 for the first twelve weeks of his per-
formance plus $10,416.66 for each additional week payable out of net receipts.
Id. Ferrer was also to receive a stipulated percentage of net profits. Id. at 128-
29.
102. Id.
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for the release of his rights in the film was at issue. 0 3 The rights
transferred by Ferrer to the film company were contract rights.
Thus, Ferrer was able to get capital gain treatment for part of his
interest.
Despite the Reece and Wodehouse cases, there has been a hos-
tile judicial climate towards allowing capital gain treatment for
the disposition of contract rights. The courts have declared that
such rights are not property in the tax sense; that the considera-
tion received is merely a lump sum for future ordinary income; or
that the property is acquired to serve a business purpose. 04
However, because the court in Ferrer was willing to fragment the
interest which Ferrer had under the contract, Ferrer was able to
get capital gain treatment for part of his interest. The exclusive
theatrical production rights held by Ferrer were likened to a
103. Id. at 128-29.
104. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp. Co., 364 U.S. 130
(1960). In Gillette, the owner of a trucking company received compensation from
the government which had assumed control of his facilities during World War II.
Id. at 131. The Supreme Court held that this compensation constituted ordinary
income and not a capital gain resulting from an involuntary conversion of his
capital assets. Id. at 135-36. The Court based its conclusion on its opinion that
what the government had "taken" was the right of the owner to determine the
use to which his facilities could be put and such a right is not a capital asset. Id.
at 135. The Court held that "the right to use is ... simply an incident of the
underlying physical property, the recompense for which is commonly regarded
as rent." Id.
In Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958), a company as-
signed an oil payment right to its president in consideration for the cancellation
of a $600,000 debt owed by the firm to the president. Id. at 262. The corpora-
tion reported the oil payment assignment as a sale of property producing a
$600,000 profit, taxable as a long-term capital gain. Id. The Court ruled that
there was no conversion of a capital asset but merely a lump sum "substitute for
what would otherwise be received at a future time as ordinary income." Id. at
265.
In Corn Prod. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955), the
Supreme Court held that commodities futures, which are contracts "to purchase
some fixed amount of a commodity at a future date for a fixed price," were not
separate from Corn Products' manufacturing process but actually vital to it and
were not "property" entitled to capital gain treatment. Id. at 47 n. 1, 50. See also
Eustice, supra note 63, at 3. Professor Eustice points out that the hostile treat-
ment to the disposition of contract rights is difficult to explain especially where
other groups, such as executives with stock options, farmers, inventors and live-
stock breeders, receive more favorable treatment under existing capital gain
rules. Id.
Professor Eustice asserts that a taxpayer can prevail on the capital gain
question if he or she can show one or more of the following factors: (1) the
rights are incidental to real or personal property; (2) the transfer is made to a
third person by way of assignment rather than by cancellation of rights; (3) the
transaction relates to a specific statutory provision; (4) the taxpayer has made a
substantial capital investment in his contract rights; and (5) the rights represent
an interest that can appreciate in value over a period of years, rather than a right
to receive a fixed amount of ordinary income. Id. at 4.
1986] 955
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leasehold interest in real property. Ferrer's power to prevent the
author from transferring his retained film rights was found by the
court to be an encumbrance which clouded the author's title to
his property. The third right was the contingent royalty interest
Ferrer would get if the author sold his copyrighted work. The
contract stipulated that the author held all title to the work. As
such, Ferrer's only right was to share in the future proceeds of
property owned by another. Therefore, the sale of this interest
was found to produce ordinary income.' 0 5
The Ferrer court looked to the existence of an equitable inter-
est or estate in specific property to determine whether the interest
transferred was a property right. At the same time, the court held
that the right to share in the profit of another's property was not a
capital asset. ' 06
In Nat Holt v. Commissioner,10 7 the Tax Court similarly held
that certain performers and entertainers could receive capital
gain treatment for a transfer of contract rights, but to do so, they
must transfer rights in, or title to, a tangible asset such as a story
or radio or television show. In Holt, Nat Holt entered into agree-
ments with Paramount Pictures Corporation to produce eleven
motion pictures for Paramount. 08 Holt was to receive a fixed
producer's fee of $15,000 or $20,000 for each film produced and
a 25% participatory interest in the excess gross receipts of the
picture. 10 9 After nine of the eleven films were produced, Holt
105. Ferrer, 304 F.2d at 133-34. Professor Eustice agreed with the court,
stating that Ferrer's right to a contingent royalty interest in any consideration
earned by the author from his sale of the retained film rights was taxable as
ordinary income rather than capital gain because Ferrer did not obtain any prop-
erty interest, legal or equitable, in the film rights. Eustice, supra note 63, at 9.
Rather, the contract specified that the entire interest was retained by the author.
Id. Ferrer's only interest was his right to share in the proceeds of the property
owned by LaMure, and was, therefore, an ordinary income right. Id.
Professor Eustice further suggests that if the play had been produced and
LaMure had sold the movie rights, Ferrer's resulting royalties would have been
ordinary income. Id. Professor Eustice points to the court's recognition that the
contingent royalty rights were not enhanced by the fact that the contingency
never occurred (i.e., the play was never produced). Id. Rather, what Ferrer re-
ceived to cancel these rights was merely a substitute for future ordinary income.
Id.
106. Ferrer, 304 F.2d at 133.
107. Holt v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 588 (1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 687 (9th
Cir. 1962).
108. 35 T.C. at 589-90, 593-94.
109. Id. at 591, 594. The fee for the first two pictures was to be paid as
follows: $5,000 upon approval of the story material, $5,000 upon commence-
ment of the photography and $5,000 upon completion and delivery of the pic-
ture. Id. at 591.
956 [Vol. 3 1: p. 931
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss3/4
COPYRIGHTS AND PATENTS
and Paramount entered into an agreement terminating the pro-
duction of any futher pictures, wherein Paramount paid $153,000
to Holt and Holt released Paramount from all obligations with
respect to the remaining two films." 0
At approximately the same time as the production agree-
ments were terminated, Holt bought two unproduced picture sto-
ries from Paramount for $500, one of which was later sold for
$15,000.111
The Tax Court addressed the issues of whether the $153,000
and $15,000 payments received by Holt were ordinary income or
capital gain." 2 The court held that the $153,000 payment was
ordinary income because it was a substitute for future income
which Holt would have received if he had produced the two re-
maining pictures."13 The court found that the $15,000 payment
for the sale of the story was capital gain, implying that a story was
a capital gain asset. 1 4
Sale or Exchange Issue
Another impediment to capital gain treatment under section
1222 of the Code is that a taxpayer must "sell or exchange" a
capital asset in order to be able to realize long-term capital
gain.' 15 Therefore, once the taxpayer shows that the rights he
has transferred are property rights, he must then also be able to
show that he has actually given up control of those rights. 116 If
the taxpayer fails to make this showing, the court can find that the
assignment of income doctrine applies, and deny capital gain
treatment to the transaction. 117
In the case of a transfer involving a patent, section 1235 spe-
110. Id. at 595-96. $7,625.00 was to be paid to Holt on or before Decem-
ber 31, 1953; $114,875.00 was to be paid onJanuary 11, 1954; and $30,500.00
was to be paid on January 10, 1955. Id. at 595.
111. Id. at 597. These two stories were the works that Holt had originally
agreed to produce for Paramount but he later obtained a release. Id.
112. Id. at 598, 600.
113. Id. at 598-99. The court noted that the amount received for the can-
cellation of the right to produce the two films was not a return of capital. Id. at
599. The nature of the property right relinquished did not turn the receipt of
mere future income into the sale of a capital asset. Id.
114. Id. at 601.
115. I.R.C. § 1222(3) (Supp. III 1985). For the text of section 1222(3), see
supra note 4.
116. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. I I I (1930). For a discussion of the
facts in Lucas, see supra note 62.
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cifically states that the taxpayer need only show that he has parted
with all "substantial rights" to the patent in order to have the
transaction deemed a sale of a capital asset. I I A copyright, on
the other hand, has traditionally been viewed by courts as a bun-
dle of separate but indivisible rights. 1 9 A transfer of less than all
the rights in the copyrighted property was not a sale, but rather
was viewed as a license.' 20 Often, a copyright creator would
transfer his work but retain the copyright itself (i.e., the right to
make copies remained with the artist). The purchaser of the
copyrighted property could not then realize capital gain upon its
subsequent transfer because he could not transfer all of the rights
in the property.' 2' Then, in 1950, the Service issued Revenue
Ruling 54-409 which stated that a copyright could be divisible for
tax purposes provided that the consideration received for a trans-
fer of less than the whole bundle of rights is a fixed sum, is not
based on a percentage of future sales, and is not payable over a
period coterminous with the grantee's use of the work. 122
In 1960, in Revenue Ruling 60-226, the Service modified
118. I.R.C. § 1235(a) (Supp. III 1985). For the text of section 1235, see
supra note 6.
119. See, e.g., Cory v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. de-
nied, 352 U.S. 828 (1956), in which the Second Circuit upheld the finding of the
Tax Court that only a part of the "bundle of rights" that constitute a copyright
was transferred. See also Shine, supra note 81, at 442.
120. Cory v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 941, 943 (2d Cir. 1956) (when only
part of "bundle of rights" constituting copyright is transferred, transfer is grant
of license rather than sale of property), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 828 (1956); see also
Shine, supra note 81, at 442.
121. See Shine, supra note 81, at 443. For a general discussion of the Shine
article, see supra note 81.
122. Rev. Rul. 54-409, 1954-2 C.B. 174. Prior to Revenue Ruling 54-409,
the Service maintained the position that a copyright was not divisible into sepa-
rate properties and that a grant of less than all rights conferred by a copyright
must be a license (the consideration received being rental or royalty income)
and not a sale. Id. at 174-75 (citing I.T. 2735, C.B. XII-2, 131 (1933)). The
Service changed its position in light of the marketplace in which copyrights were
bought and sold. Id. at 175. The Service noted that what constitutes a separable
and defined piece of property in the marketplace was relevant in determining
whether transfers of copyrights were a sale of property or a rental. Id. The
Service stated that even though the grantee of less than all the rights conferred
by a copyright is a "licensee," this had nothing to do with the question of what
rights in the copyright do or do not constitute separable property. Id. (citing
Independent Wireless Co. v. Radio Corp., 269 U.S. 459 (1926)). Rather, the
Service recognized that a grant of less than all the rights in a copyright can be a
sale of property where the exclusive right to exploit the copyrighted work is
given in a particular medium. Id. The Service reasoned that the grant of the
exclusive right to exploit a copyrighted work in a particular medium may itself
be copyrighted as ifit were a new work. Id. Thus, the grant conveyed a property
right. Id. (citing L. C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196 (2d Cir.
1936)).
958 [Vol. 3 1: p. 931
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss3/4
COPYRIGHTS AND PATENTS
Revenue Ruling 54-409 by stating "that assignments of copy-
rights will not be denied treatment as sales solely because of the
form which the purchase price takes."' 23 The Revenue Ruling
held that
the consideration received by a proprietor of a copyright
for a grant transferring the exclusive right to exploit the
copyrighted work . . . throughout the life of the copy-
right shall be treated as proceeds from the sale of prop-
erty, regardless of whether the consideration received is
measured by a percentage of the receipts from the sale,
performance, exhibition or publication of the copy-
righted work, or is measured by the number of copies
sold ... 124
Significantly, the Service stated that its ruling was based on the
similarities between copyrights and patents, and the explicit man-
date of the Code that patents be given sale treatment whether
payments are contingent or periodic. 25
Furthermore, in 1983, the Service stated in General Counsel
Memo 39252126 that an author who did not grant worldwide
rights in her novels to a publisher was not precluded from treat-
ing the transfers as sales.' 27 It was sufficient that exclusive rights
were granted for each of the three countries covered by the con-
tracts between the author and the publisher. 28 The memo rea-
123. Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26, 27.
124. Id. at 26. For a further discussion of Revenue Ruling 60-226, see supra
note 64 and accompanying text and infra note 148 and accompanying text.
125. Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26, 27.
126. G.C.M. 39252, 24 TAx NOTEs 362 (1984).
127. Id. at 363.
128. Id. In G.C.M. 39252, "A," an author, granted to the publisher "the
exclusive right to print, publish, and license publication of her novel ... in the
United States, Canada and the Philippines." Id. at 362. The publisher paid
$2,500 on execution of the contract and an additional $2,500 on delivery of the
manuscript. Id. The money was treated as an advance on royalty payments but
was not repayable. Id. Royalties were "based on the number of books sold and
the type of edition." Id. "A" was the owner of the copyright on the novel, and
the contract did not transfer all of the rights arising under the copyright, only
those enumerated. Id. "A" retained the right to terminate the contract if the
publisher failed to keep the book in print or became bankrupt. Id.
"A" proposed to transfer all the assets and liabilities of her business as an
author to a corporation. Id. The transfer would include all of her rights, title,
and interest in her copyrighted works, including her contracts with the pub-
lisher. Id.
The first issue presented was whether "A" "was currently taxable on the fair
market value of deferred guaranteed payments and royalties to be received from
[the] publisher in exchange for the transfer of the publication rights to the novel
she had written." Id. The Service concluded that "the fair market value of the
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soned that this was sufficient for patents and is in accord with
Revenue Ruling 60-226.129
At an earlier date, the Tax Court, in TeLinde v. Commis-
sioner,130 had held that merely because the consideration received
for a transfer of all the rights in a copyrighted property was not a
fixed amount, what would otherwise be a sale is not transmuted
into a mere license. 13 The taxpayer in TeLinde sold his entire in-
terest in a manuscript in exchange for royalty payments based
rights acquired by the author under the contract was not taxable [to "A"] in the
year the right to publish the novel was sold to the publisher." Id. Payments
under the contract were taxable to the author, a cash-basis taxpayer, when re-
ceived. Id. at 363 (citing, e.g., Oates v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 570 (1952), aff'd,
207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953)).
In so holding, the Service noted that "a sale may occur upon the grant of
the exclusive right to exploit a copyrighted work in a medium of publication
throughout the life of the copyright, regardless of whether the consideration
received by the grantor" is based on proceeds from sales of the book or receipts
payable over a period of time coterminous with the term of the grant. Id. at 362
(citing Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26). The right of the grantor to terminate
the grant upon certain subsequent conditions was not inconsistent with sale
treatment. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 C.B. 408). The Service also re-
lied on Revenue Ruling 75-202, which held that "amounts received by a corpo-
ration under a contract by which it conveyed a book copyright in exchange for
royalties are income from the sale of the copyright and not copyright royal-
ties..." Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 75-202, 1975-1 C.B. 170). For a discussion of
Revenue Ruling 60-226, see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
The second issue presented was whether the assignment of income princi-
ple required that the royalties the corporation received be taxed to "A," the
author, rather than to the corporation. Id. at 363. The Service held that the
payments were taxable to the corporation, noting that "the assignment of in-
come principle has not been applied to cases in which a taxpayer assigns income
producing property to his controlled corporation .... ." Id. (citing Fox v. Com-
missioner, 37 B.T.A. 271 (1983), relying on Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5
(1937)).
129. G.C.M. 39252, 24 TAX NOTES at 362.
130. TeLinde v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 91 (1952).
131. Id. at 95. In Telinde, the publisher sold copies of the book the same day
as the publisher copyrighted the book. Id. at 94. On April 30, 1947, the author
received his first royalty check which he claimed as long-term capital gains. Id.
The I.R.S. challenged this treatment and asserted that the royalties were taxable
as ordinary income. Id. In the alternative, the I.R.S. argued that even if it was a
sale, the amount would be taxable as a short-term capital gain because the asset
was held less than six months. Id.
The court held that the royalty income was subject to capital gains treat-
ment because the publisher received all of the rights incorporated in the prop-
erty for the full term of the copyright, leaving no interest in the hands of the
transferor. Id. at 94-95.
As to the alternative assertion of the I.R.S. concerning the six month hold-
ing period, the court held that the time requirement for long-term capital gains
treatment was not met because the manuscript was completed by the middle of
1944, but the title did not pass to the publisher until its delivery in August, 1945,
a period of more than six months. Id. at 95.
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upon future sales.13 2 The taxpayer reported the royalty payments
from the publisher as long-term capital gains.' 33 The Service ar-
gued that the payments were ordinary income or, alternatively,
they should be taxable as short-term capital gain because if the
transaction was a sale, the asset had been held less than six
months.13 4 Since the author had contracted with the publisher in
1941 and had not written the book until 1944, the contract dealt
with property that was not yet in existence and thus did not en-
compass passage of title.' 35 Since by January, 1945 the author
had the completed manuscript in his possession and did not de-
liver it until August, 1945, more than six months had passed prior
to its sale. 13 6 To have his transaction adjusted as a sale meant
that the author could realize long-term capital gain.
The sale or exchange issue was also raised in the Ferrer
case. 137 While the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that payments received from the cancellation of some
exclusive contract rights were ordinary income due to a lack of
sale or exchange,13 8 the Tax Court in Ferrer v. Commissioner 139 rea-
soned that, since Ferrer was not in the business of dealing in liter-
ary property, his contract rights were sufficiently significant and
that "cancellation" of those beneficial interests was a sale of capi-
tal assets.140 The Second Circuit examined each of Ferrer's con-
tract rights individually and determined that two "were 'capital
assets' and one was not."' 14 1
I.R.C. section 1222 requires a capital asset to be held for
more than six months in order to realize long-term captal gain on
its sale or exchange. 142 The court of appeals in Ferrer held that
132. Id. at 93.
133. Id. at 94.
134. Id. The parties were in agreement that the property transferred was a
capital asset. Id. The difference in opinion centered on the characterization of
the transfer. Id. The taxpayer contended that the transfer was a sale, while the
Commissioner argued that the transfer constituted a mere license. Id.
135. Id. at 95.
136. Id.
137. Ferrer v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 617 (1961), rev'd, 304 F.2d 125 (2d
Cir. 1962).
138. Ferrer, 304 F.2d at 130 (citing, e.g., Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc.,
204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953) (cancellation of exclusive distributorship did not
constitute sale or exchange of capital asset)).
139. Ferrer, 35 T.C. 617 (1961).
140. Id. at 625-26. See also Eustice, supra note 63, at 7.
141. Ferrer, 304 F.2d at 133-34. Payment in exchange for "Ferrer's right to
receive 40% of the proceeds" was found to be ordinary income. Id.
142. I.R.C. § 1222(3) (Supp. III 1985). For the relevant text of section
1222(3), see supra note 4.
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Ferrer's rights did not fall within section 1221(3) which provides
ordinary asset classification for copyrighted property held by its
creator.1 43 Since Ferrer was not the creator of the play, 14 4 the
court recognized that payments received in exchange for exclu-
sive contract rights, which served to terminate those rights, con-
stitued a "sale."' 45 Therefore, Ferrer could realize capital gain
for those payments under section 1222.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
Holt, refused to find a "sale" when the taxpayer argued that can-
cellation of his contract rights with Paramount was a sale of his
partnership interest. 146 Because the court found no sale, the tax-
payer realized only ordinary income.' 47
Thus the outcome of the issue of whether a sale has occurred
has different consequences depending upon the role of the tax-
payer. In Revenue Ruling 60-226, the Service referred to the
holder of a copyright as the "proprietor" in ruling that royalty
payments received in exchange for exclusive copyrights were to
be treated as a sale.' 48 The Service was careful to note in that
ruling that whether a copyright was a capital asset within the
meaning of I.R.C. section 1221 was a "separate and distinct
question." 149
The Service used the term "proprietor in Revenue Ruling
60-226," as opposed to "creator" or even "holder" which could
be confused with "holder" as defined in I.R.C. section 1235.150
Hence, the possibility that the "proprietor" might be one who has
purchased the copyrighted property from its creator was left
open. A purchaser would want that classificaton so that on a sub-
sequent transfer, she could have the transaction deemed a sale in
order to realize long-term capital gain.
143. Ferrer, 304 F.2d at 132. For the text of section 1221(3), see supra note
28.
144. Ferrer, 304 F.2d at 126.
145. Id. at 132-33. Ferrer "sold" his lease of the play and his negative
power to prevent disposition of the motion picture, radio and television rights
until after the play was produced. Id. For a further discussion of Ferrer, see supra
notes 87-103, 138-39 and accompanying text; infra notes 151-53, 265 and ac-
companying text.
146. Holt v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 588 (1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 687, 691
(9th Cir. 1962).
147. Id. For a further discussion of Holt, see supra notes 107-14 and accom-
panying text; infra note 171 and accompanying text.
148. Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26, 27.
149. Id. For a further discussion of Revenue Ruling 60-226, see supra note
64 and accompanying text.
150. For the definition of "holder" in I.R.C. § 1235(b), see supra note 6.
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The Ferrer appellate court also utilized the concept of "pro-
prietor."' 151 Because Ferrer stood as a proprietor in relation to
his rights, and not as a creator or holder, he was able to convince
the court to recognize the transfer of two of his rights as produc-
ing long-term capital gain. 152 Ferrer had acquired contract rights
to the copyrighted property, which the court analogized to real
property law (i.e., that these rights were themselves income-pro-
ducing property). The court was then able to find a "sale" of
those rights. With respect to the contingent royalty right which
Ferrer would get if the author sold his property, the Ferrer court
still found a sale, although the court held that the profit from the
sale would be ordinary income because it was the sale of a right to
future income of property held by another. 53
151. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
152. Id. at 133-34.
153. Id. at 134. General Counsel Memo 39252 indicates that an author or
artist in some circumstances may not want to have the transfer of his copy-
righted property characterized as a sale. G.C.M. 39252, 24 TAX NOTES 362, 363
(1984). The Memo addressed the case of a taxpayer who wanted the royalty
payments to be received in exchange for a grant of exclusive rights in the copy-
righted property to be taxed as deferred compensation. In reaching the conclu-
sion that these payments should be taxed when received, the Service reasoned
that although the income received from transfers of assets created by the tax-
payer's personal efforts were gains from the sale of property under Revenue
Ruling 60-226, these payments could still be considered as earned income for
the purposes of deferred compensation. Id. at 363. To call the transaction a
sale, which Revenue Ruling 60-226 allows even if the payments are contingent
as long as exclusive rights are granted, means that the property or rights trans-
ferred must be valued. Id. at 362. So, the transfer of publication rights consti-
tuted a sale.
Under Revenue Ruling 60-3 1, however, in which an author granted his pub-
lisher the exclusive right to print, publish and sell a book he had written, the
Service held that an author could contract with his publishers to have an em-
ployer-employee relationship. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 176, 178-79.
The agreement provided that the publisher would pay the author specified roy-
alties based on the amount of cash received from the sale of the published work,
render semi-annual statements of the sales, and at the time of rendering each
statement, make settlement for the amount due. Id. at 176. On the same day,
another agreement was signed by the parties, agreeing that in consideration of,
and notwithstanding any contrary provisions contained in the first contract, the
publisher would not pay the taxpayer more than $100,000 in any one calendar
year. Id. Under this second contract, sums in excess of $100,000 which accrued
in any one calendar year would be carried over by the publisher into the suc-
ceeding accounting periods. Additionally, the publisher was not required to pay
interest on any excess sums or to segregate any such sums in any manner. Id.
The Revenue Ruling held that this arrangement was not materially different
from a contract in which an employee and his employer agree to defer the em-
ployee's salary; so long as the amounts deferred are unsecured and not repre-
sented by indebtedness, there is no constructive receipt. Id. at 175, 177-79. The
author was required to include the royalties in gross income only in the taxable
years in which they were actually received. Id. at 179.
In deciding that the payments would be taxed when received, General
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Before proceeding to the next issue, a comment about the
plight of the artist or author is necessary. As evidenced by Gen-
eral Counsel Memo 39252, the artist is in a kind of limbo. One of
his battles is that the service may argue that his transfer is not a
sale.' 54 In another, he must fight that his transfer is in fact a sale
and, therefore, not earned income.' 55 Furthermore, he (as well as
Counsel Memo 39252 relied on Revenue Ruling 60-31 and also cited Tobey v.
Commissioner, in which the court held that the income from the sale of some
paintings was earned income for the purpose of I.R.C. section 911. G.C.M.
39252, 24 TAX NOTES at 363 (citing Tobey v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 227
(1973)).
The Tax Court in Tobey focused on the distinction between income derived
from the taxpayer's personal efforts and income that represents a return of capi-
tal. Tobey v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 227 (1973). In so doing, the court rejected
two earlier cases which had used the product test to determine whether earned
income existed. Id. at 232 (citing E. Phillips Oppenheim v. Commissioner, 31
B.T.A. 563 (1934); Frank L. Kluckhohn v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 892 (1952)).
The product test looked to the distinction as to whether there was a prior
contract or order for the product. Note, Robida and Tobey: The New Test for Section
911 Earned Income, 27 TAx LAw 492, 495 (1973). If a contract existed whereby
the author had contracted or was employed to write a book, then the payments,
either in lump sum or royalties, were for personal services actually rendered
and, therefore, came within the term "earned income." If, on the other hand,
the product was in existence at the time the contract was agreed upon, then the
payments were for the sale or use of the property. Therefore, they were not
within the term "earned income." Id. (citing G.C.M. 236, VI-2 (C.B. 27 (1927)).
This General Counsel Memo was superceded by Revenue Ruling 71-315, 1971-2
C.B. 217, which restated the Service's position.
The Tobey court clearly rejected the earlier distinction which was based on
the terms of the contract that the taxpayer-artist had entered. Tobey v. Commis-
sioner, 60 T.C. 227, 235 (1973). Instead, the Tax Court adhered to the view
that the earned income requirement is designed merely to prevent the exclusion
of passive income, such as rental income, interest, and dividends, from section
911. Id. at 232.
After Tobey was decided, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 80-254 wherein
the principle enunciated in Tobey was applied to authors as well as artists. Rev.
Rul. 80-254, 1980-2 C.B. 222. Once the author or artist has the transaction
characterized as earned income, then he may defer payment of taxes until this
income is actually received.
According to General Counsel Memo 39252, therefore, an artist or author
can have income from the sale of his creation treated as earned income for the
purpose of deferred compensation. G.C.M. 39252, 24 TAX NOTES at 363. This
enables an artist to fall within section 453 of the Code to get installment sales
treatment. I.R.C. § 453 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 453, as amended in
1980, removes the impediment of the old law to installment sales treatment of
copyrights in exchange for royalties. Now the rule that proceeds of a sale of
property are to be valued and taxed currently will not be applied. G.C.M.
39252, 24 TAX NOTES at 363. For a further discussion of G.C.M. 39252, see
supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
154. See TeLinde v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 91 (1952). For a further discus-
sion of TeLinde, see supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
155. See Tobey v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 227 (1973). For a further discussion
of Tobey and the earned income problem, see supra note 153 and accompanying
text; infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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the person acquiring the copyrighted property) must argue that
the contract rights he receives in exchange for his copyrighted
work are themselves income-producing property. 56 Otherwise,
he argues that his contract rights are in fact for future income. In
some respects, the artist can manipulate this lack of certainty to
his advantage.
The artist's plight is well illustrated by Tobey v. Commis-
sioner.157 The Tax Court inTobey stated, in dicta, that an artist is
usually a "hard-working, trained, career oriented individual ...
[who] has keen competition from many other artists who must
create and sell their works to survive."'' 58
Usually, artists lack the time, money and inclination to at-
tempt a contrived form of doing business (such as the creation
and sale of contract rights or classifying their income as earned
income to fall within the rubric of I.R.C. section 911) in order to
avoid paying excessive taxes, only to find that in their particular
situation, the form does not work. There is too much uncertainty
for the artist in the Tax Code. This environment does not foster
creativity. Consequently, we all lose. An inventor, on the other
hand, does not face any of this uncertainty. Once he gets the Ser-
vice to accept his invention as one which comes under the rubric
of section 1235, he is home free.
Mandatory Holding Period
The next issue is the mandatory holding period of section
1222. A taxpayer must hold the asset for more than six months
before he transfers it in order to realize long-term capital gain. 159
Under the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, property acquired be-
tweenJune 22, 1984 and Decmber 31, 1987 must be held for six
months and one day. 160 In contrast, the "holder" of a patent has
no holding period under section 1235: "a transfer of property...
by any holder shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital
156. See Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962); Benny v. Commissioner, 25
T.C. 197 (1955). For a further discussion of Ferrer, see supra notes 87-103, 138-
44; infra note 265 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Benny, see
infra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
157. 60 T.C. 227 (1973). For a further discussion of Tobey, see supra note
153.
158. Tobey, 60 T.C. at 235.
159. I.R.C. § 1222(3) (Supp. III 1985). For the text of section 1222(3), see
supra note 4.
160. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984)
(codified at I.R.C. § 1222(1)-(4) (Supp. III 1985)). See H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 757, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1445, 1952.
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asset held for more than 6 months ..... 161
Investment Purpose v. Business Purpose
The Supreme Court, in Burnet v. Harmel,'62 stated that the
policy of taxing capital gains at a lower rate than ordinary income
is "to relieve the taxpayer from.., excessive tax burdens on gains
resulting from a conversion of capital investments, and to remove
the deterrent effect of those burdens on such conversions."'163
The Supreme Court reiterated this policy in Corn Products Refining
Co. v. Commissioner.164 The Court, in Corn Products, stated that
Congress intended the profit from the everyday operation of busi-
ness to be considered as ordinary income.' 65 The preferential
treatment of the capital gains provisions of the Code is to apply
only "to transactions in property which are not the normal source
of business income."' 66  Furthermore, the Court stated that
161. I.R.C. § 1235(a) (Supp. III 1985). For the full text of section 1235, see
supra note 6.
162. 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
163. Id. at 106 (citing H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921)).
In Burnet, the Court held that a lessor's receipts from an oil and gas lease were
taxable not as gain from the sale of capital assets, but, rather, as ordinary in-
come. Id. at 106. Despite the transfer of the ownership of oil and gas from
lessor to lessee which accompanies such a lease, the Court found the receipts to
be similar to rental payments. Id. The taxation of the lessor's receipts as in-
come, therefore, did not produce the type of hardship involved in the conver-
sion of assets which the capital gains provision seeks to void. Id.
The Burnet Court's enunciation of the policy behind the capital gains provi-
sion was further delineated in the legislative history to I.R.C. § 1221. For a dis-
cussion of this legislative history, see infra notes 197-202 and accompanying
text.
164. 350 U.S. 46 (1955). For a further discussion of Corn Products, see supra
note 104.
165. Id. at 52. In Corn Products, the Court held that the petitioner's partial
"hedging" transactions involving purchases and sales of corn futures to insure
against loss by unfavorable changes in the market price of a commodity did not
constitute capital asset transactions. Id. at 47, 49-50. Finding the transactions to
be an integral part of the petitioner's manufacturing business, the Court held
that they did not deserve the capital asset treatment accorded property which is
not the normal source of business income. Id. at 51-52. The resulting gains and
losses from the transactions, therefore, were to be treated as ordinary income
and ordinary deductions. Id. at 47.
The Court's decision in Corn Products has given rise to what has been termed
the "Corn Products doctrine": partial hedging by a manufacturer whose raw
materials are a commodity being traded are to be treated as if they were inven-
tory and not as a capital asset. Traditional capital assets, therefore, will be taxed
as ordinary assets based on the taxpayer's purpose in acquiring them. For a
further discussion of "hedging" and the "Corn Products doctrine," see 3BJ. MER-
TENS, supra note 15, § 22.14; Note, Taxation of Commodity Futures Used as Hedges, 13
TAX L. REV. 87 (1957); Javaras, Corporate Capital Gains and Losses-The Corn Prod-
ucts Doctrine, 52 TAXES 770 (1974).
166. 350 U.S. at 52.
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"since [section 117] is an exception from the normal tax require-
ments of the Internal Revenue Code, the definition of a capital
asset must be narrowly applied and its exclusions interpreted
broadly."' 167 Essentially, therefore, a capital transaction must be
for an investment purpose as opposed to a business purpose.
The enactment of I.R.C. section 1235 occurred prior to the
Corn Products decision, but after Burnet v. Harmel. Corn Products
clearly affirmed the Court's position on the policy of relieving tax
burdens which are due as a result of investments in contrast to
profit from business.' 68 Yet, in enacting section 1235, Congress
seemingly went against its own stated policy and that of the
Supreme Court. 169 Through section 1235, Congress allowed an
inventor, who may be in the business of inventing, to shield a sub-
stantial portion of his business profits under the capital asset clas-
sifications for patents and inventions with its deemed sale and
holding period.' 70
Capital Gain Treatment for Appreciation of Purchased Property
One final important factor which has influenced the charac-
terization of a transaction is the tax policy to treat appreciation in
the value of a capital asset as a capital gain upon the asset's sale.
This policy was initiated to lessen the hardship of taxation which
occurs when the appreciation which has accumulated over the
years is realized in the year of conversion.' 7 1
167. Id. In thus narrowly applying the definition of capital assets and
broadly interpreting the exclusions of section 117, the Court expressly sustained
the exclusion from capital assets of futures dealt in for hedging purposes. Id.
168. Id.
169. For a discussion of Congressional reasons behind the enactment of
section 1235, see infra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.
170. For the full text of section 1235, see supra note 6.
171. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134
(1960). The Supreme Court had recognized the Congressional purpose to af-
ford capital gain treatment "in situations typically involving the realization of
appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time, and then to ame-
liorate the hardship of taxation of the entire gain in one year." Id.; see also Holt
v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 588 (1961) (finding "[tihe leniency [toward] taxation
of capital gains has its genesis in the theory that it would be inequitable to tax all
the increase in value of a capital asset, which has occurred over a number of
years, in the year in which it is converted"), aff'd, 303 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
For a discussion of the Congressional policy affording capital gain treatment
only in situations involving appreciation in value which has accrued over a sub-
stantial period of time in order to ease the hardship of taxing the entire gain in
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B. Provisions Other than I.R.C. Section 1235 Which Specifically
Benefit Inventors
In addition to the capital gains provisions of the Code, many
other provisions discriminate in favor of inventors and patentees
and against artists and authors. One such provision is section
174172 which governs the treatment of research and experimental
expenditures. Under section 174, a taxpayer may either deduct
or amortize the research and experimental expenditures which
were paid or accrued "in connection with his trade or busi-
ness."173 In order to take advantage of section 174, however, sec-
tion 162 requires that the taxpayer be "engaged in carrying on a
trade or business." 74 The taxpayer may take the deduction or he
may elect to amortize his expenses.' 75 A patent need not have
been issued nor even applied for because even the business-re-
lated expenses for self-development of know-how qualify for de-
ductions under section 174.176
The Treasury Regulations define "research and experimental
expenditures" to mean "research and developmental costs in the
experimental or laboratory sense."' 177 The term includes gener-
172. I.R.C. § 174 (1982). For the relevant text of section 174(a), see supra
note 18.
173. I.R.C. § 174 (1982).
174. Id. § 162 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 162(a) provides, in perti-
nent part: "there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business .... ." Id. For a discussion of the distinctions between section 162
requirements and section 174 requirements, see Morreale, supra note 46, at 564.
175. I.R.C. § 174 (1982). Should the taxpayer elect to amortize his re-
search or experimental expenses, he may write them off over a period of not less
than sixty months, beginning with the month in which benefits are first realized.
Id. § 174(b)(1).
Expenditures treated as deferred expenses under section 174(b)(1) are
chargeable to capital account and increase the basis of the property to
which they relate. The basis so adjusted is reduced by the amount of
[research or experimental expenses] allowed as deductions which re-
sults in a reduction of the taxpayer's taxes, but not less than the amount
allowable for the taxable year and prior years.
4 FED. TAXES (P-H) 16,206 (1986); see also I.R.C. § 1016(a)(14) (1982).
176. For a discussion of the deductability under section 174 of business
related expenditures for the self-development of know-how, see Morreale, supra
note 46, at 564-65.
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a) (1960). The regulation provides, in pertinent
part:
(a) In general.
(1) The term "research or experimental expenditures", as used
in section 174, means expenditures incurred in connection with the tax-
payer's trade or business which represent research and development
costs in the experimental or laboratory sense. The term includes gen-
erally all such costs incident to the development of an experimental or
[Vol. 3 1: p. 931968
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ally all such costs incident to the dvelopment of an experimental
or pilot model, a plant process, a producer, a formula, an inven-
tion, or similar property, and the improvement of an already ex-
isting property of the type mentioned. 178 Furthermore, the term
includes costs incurred in securing a patent, such as attorney's
fees.' 79 The regulations specifically exclude, however, the ex-
penses paid or incurred for research in connection with literary or
historical projects.180
The Code also provides a credit in section 30 for research
and experimental expenditures paid or incurred after June 30,
1981.181 This credit is available regardless of whether the tax-
pilot model, a plant process, a product, a formula, an invention, or sim-
ilar property, and the improvement of already existing property of the
type mentioned. The term does not include expenditures such as those
for the ordinary testing or inspection of materials or products for qual-
ity control or those for efficiency surveys, management studies, con-
sumer surveys, advertising or promotions. However, the term includes
the costs of obtaining a patent, such as attorneys' fees expended in
making and perfecting a patent application. On the other hand, the
term does not include the costs of acquiring another's patent, model,
production or process, nor does it include expenditures paid or in-
curred for research in connection with literary, historical, or similar
projects.
(2) The provisions of this section apply not only to costs paid or
incurred by the taxpayer for research or experimentation undertaken
directly by him but also to expenditures paid or incurred for research
or experimentation carried on in his behalf by another person or or-
ganization (such as a research institute, foundation, engineering com-
pany, or similar contractor). However, any expenditures for research
or experimentation carried on in the taxpayer's behalf by another per-
son are not expenditures to which section 174 relates, to the extent that
they represent expenditures for the acquisition of improvement of land
or depreciable property, used in connection with the research or exper-





181. I.R.C. § 30 (Supp. III 1985) (renumbering I.R.C. § 44F (1982)).
I.R.C. section 30 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule-There shall be allowed as a credit against the tax
imposed by this chapter for the taxable year an amount equal to 25
percent of the excess (if any) of-
(1) the qualified research expenses for the taxable year, over
(2) the base period research expenses.
(b) Qualified Research Expenses-For purposes of this section-
(1) Qualified Research Expenses-The term "qualified research
expenses" means the sum of the following amounts which are paid
or incurred by the taxpayer during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business of the taxpayer-
(A) in-house research expenses, and
(B) contract research expenses.
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payer has elected under section 174 to deduct or amortize ex-
(2) In-house Research Expenses-
(A) In General-The term "in-house research expenses"
means-
(i) any wages paid or incurred to an employee for quali-
fied services performed by such employee,
(ii) any amount paid or incurred for supplies used in the
conduct of qualified research, and
(iii) any amount paid or incurred to another person for
the right to use personal property in the conduct of quali-
fied research.
Clause (iii) shall not apply to any amount to the extent that the
taxpayer (or any person with whom the taxpayer must aggregate
expenditures under subsection (0(1)) receives or accrues any
amount from any other person for the right to use substantially
identical personal property.
(B) Qualified Services-The term "qualified services" means
services consisting of-
(i) engaging in qualified research, or
(ii) engaging in the direct supervision or direct support
of research activities which constitute qualified research.
If substantially all of the services performed by an individual
for the taxpayer during the taxable year consists of services
meeting the requirements of clause (i) or (ii), the term "quali-
fied services" means all of the services performed by such indi-
vidual for the taxpayer during the taxable year.
(C) Supplies-The term "supplies" means any tangible
property other than-
(i) land or improvements to land, and
(ii) property of a character subject to the allowance for
depreciation.
(D) Wages-
(i) In General-The term "wages" has the meaning
given such term by section 3401(a).
(ii) Self-Employed Individuals and Owner-Employees-
In the case of an employee (within the meaning of section
401(c)(1), the term "wages" includes the earned income
(as defined in section 401(c)(2)) of such employee.
(iii) Exclusion for Wages to Which New Jobs or Win
Credit Applies-The term "wages" shall not include any
amount taken into account in determining the targeted
jobs credit under section 51(a).
(3) Contract Research Expenses-
(A) In General-The term "contract research expenses"
means 65 percent of any amount paid or incurred by the tax-
payer to any person (other than an employee of the taxpayer)
for qualified research.
(B) Prepaid Amounts-If any contract research expenses
paid or incurred during any taxable year are attributable to
qualified research to be conducted after the close of such taxa-
ble year, such amount shall be treated as paid or incurred dur-
ing the period during which the qualified research is
conducted.
(c) Base Period Research Expenses-For purposes of this section-
(i) In General-The term "base period research expenses"
means the average of the qualified research expenses for each year
in the base period.
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penditures.18 2 To qualify, the taxpayer must pay or accrue
expenses during the taxable year "in carrying on any trade or
business."18 3 In defining "qualified research expenditures," the
Code specifically excludes any research "in the social sciences or
humanities."' 8I 4 Also, under the Accelerated Cost Recovery Sys-
tem ("ACRS") for depreciation, machinery and equipment used
for experimentation and research (as defined in I.R.C. section
174) is given a three year recovery period as opposed to the
longer five, ten, or eighteen year periods used previously. 8 5
Furthermore, the Code's treatment of compensatory dam-
(2) Base Period-
(A) In General-For purposes of this subsection, the term
"base period" means the 3 taxable years immediately preced-
ing the taxable year for which the determination is being made
(hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the "determina-
tion year").
(B) Transitional Rules-Subparagraph (A) shall be applied-
(i) by substituting "first taxable year" for "3 taxable
years" in the case of the first determination year ending
afterJune 30, 1981, and
(ii) by substituting "2" for "3" in the case of the second
determination year ending after June 30, 1981.
(3) Minimum Base Period Research Expenses-In no event shall
the base period research expenses be less than 50 percent of the
qualified research expenses for the determination year.
(d) Qualified Research-For purposes of this section the term "quali-
fied research" has the same meaning as the term research or experi-
mental has under section 174, except that such term shall not include-
(1) qualified research conducted outside the United States
(2) qualified research in the social sciences or humanities, and
(3) qualified research to the extent funded by any grant, contract,
or otherwise by another person (or any governmental entity) ...
Id.
182. 4 FED. TAXES (P-H) 16,206 (1986). For a further discussion of a
taxpayer's ability to deduct or amortize research and experimental expenditures,
see supra note 175 and accompanying text.
183. I.R.C. § 30(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985). For the text of section 30(b)(1), see
supra note 172.
184. I.R.C. § 30(d)(2) (Supp. III 1985). For the text of section 30(d)(2), see
supra note 181.
185. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172
(codified at I.R.C. § 168 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). This Act created the Acceler-
ated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) for depreciable property. Id. § 201. Under
ACRS, the capital cost of property is written off over statutory recovery periods.
I.R.C. § 168. For personal property such as machinery and equipment used for
research and experimentation under I.R.C. § 174, ACRS provides a three-year
recovery period. Id. § 168(c)(2)(A). As an option, however, a taxpayer may re-
cover costs using the straight line method of depreciation rather than using the
recovery periods provided by ACRS. Id. § 168(f)(2)(C). The enactment of
ACRS sought to provide investment stimulus in the face of the decreasing value
of depreciation deductions due to inflation. For a further discussion of ACRS,
see S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-68, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 145-173; 4 FED. TAXES (P-H) 16,206 (1986).
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ages for patent infringement is preferential. Before I.R.C. section
1304 was repealed in 1964, a taxpayer was allowed to treat the
damages payment as if it had been ratably received over the years
during which the infringement occurred. 86 Under the present
tax structure, the taxpayer who is awarded damages for patent
infringement may consider those payments as if they were pay-
ments for the transfer of the patent (i.e., as capital gain).' 87 Since
copyrighted property does not fit within I.R.C. section 1235, the
Code contains no specific provision for the humanities concern-
ing compensatory damages received from infringement cases as it
does with patents. Furthermore, a Tax Court memorandum deci-
sion concerning copyrights held that the proceeds of a settlement
resulting from an exploitation of a radio program package were to
be treated as ordinary income. 88
Another significant tax discrimination against artists oc-
curred when Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1969.189
Prior to the passage of that Act, an artist could make a charitable
contribution of his work and realize no income either upon its
186. I.R.C. § 1304 (1958), repealed by Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
272, 78 Stat. 19, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 22. The original
section 1304, which was in effect between 1954 and 1964, provided in pertinent
part:
If an amount representing compensatory damages is received or
accrued by a taxpayer during a taxable year as the result of an award in
a civil action for infringement of a patent issued by the United States,
then the tax attributable to the inclusion of such amount in gross in-
come for the taxable year shall not be greater than the aggregate of the
increases in taxes which would have resulted if such amount had been
included in gross income in equal installments for each month during
which such infringement occurred.
Id.
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(c)(1) (1960). For the full text of section
1.1235-1(c) (1), see supra note 20.
188. See Kurlan v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1445, 1448 (1963),
aff'd, 343 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1965). In Kurlan, the petitioner, an independent
writer and producer of radio and television programs, submitted to Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) a sample recording for a radio program based
on characters from a literary property known as "my Sister Eileen." After refus-
ing to buy the program from the petitioner, "CBS subsequently produced a
weekly television program . . . entitled "My Friend Irma," which petitioner al-
lege[d] was similar to [his] radio program .. " 22 T.C.M. at 1446. The peti-
tioner commenced an action against CBS alleging infringement of his property
rights in the radio program. Id. at 1446-47. He ultimately settled with CBS for
$75,000. Id. at 1446.
Finding the settlement payment to be compensation to the petitioner for
any possible wrongful use by CBS of his radio program, the Tax Court held that
the $75,000 was to be treated as ordinary income since rights to compositions of
a literary nature are "not property which falls within the section 1221 definition
of capital asset .. " Id. at 1448.
189. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
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contribution or upon later disposition of the work by the do-
nee.' 90 The artist was further "entitled to a charitable deduction
. . .equal to the fair market value of the work transferred."' 9'
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 reduced the deduction for all gifts
of property by the amount that would have been ordinary income
if the donor had sold the property at its fair market value. 192 As a
result, the artist may now deduct only the actual costs of his can-
vas and oils. Additionally, the artist may not claim that the chari-
table contribution was a necessary business expense, deductible
under section 162, even if the gift was intended to promote the
artist's sales. l93 Collectors of art, on the other hand, may deduct
the full fair market value of their charitable dispositons. Their
deduction is not limited to the cost of the work. 194
190. Beghe, The Artist, The Art Market and Income Tax, 29 TAx L. REV. 491,
505, 514 (1974) (footnotes omitted). President Nixon, in fact, donated his vice
presidential papers and got the full fair market value as a deduction before the
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Id. at 516 (footnotes omitted).
191. Id. at 514. For a discussion of the applicability of the charitable contri-
bution deduction to a donor artist, see Beghe, supra note 83, at 514. Professor
Beghe noted three benefits to the donor artist prior to the Tax Reform Act of
1969: 1) the artist realized no income on disposition; 2) the artist could deduct
the fair market value of the transferred work; and 3) if the work was produced in
a previous year, the amount of the deductions was not reduced by previously
claimed deductions. Id. (Footnote omitted); see also Rudick & Gray, Bounty Twice
Blessed: Tax Consequences of Gifts of Property to or in Trust for Charity, 16 TAX. L. REV.
273 (1961) (noting the latter two benefits).
192. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(E)(1)(A), 83 Stat.
487, 555 (1969). In the 1969 Act, Congress amended I.R.C. § 170(e) to limit
the charitable contribution deduction. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A) (1982). Section
170(e)(1)(A) currently states:
(1) The amount of any charitable contribution of property other-
wise taken into account under this section shall be reduced by ...
(A) not have been long-term capital gain if the property contributed
had been sold by the taxpayer at its fair market value (determined
at the time of such contribution)....
Id.
193. See Edelstein and Mott, Tax Problems, in LEGAL AND BUSINESS
PROBLEMS OF ARTISTS, ART GALLERIES AND MUSEUMS 659 (1973).
194. See Speiller, The Favored Tax Treatment of Purchasers of Art, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 214 (1980). Professor Speiller examines the law and practice by which
purchasers of art can take advantage of the benefits of favorable tax treatment.
The author notes that a great benefit is the availability of a charitable deduction
for the appreciated value of an art work at the time of the gift. Id. at 216-17
(footnotes omitted); see also Mansfield & Groves, Legal Aspects of Charitable Contri-
butions of Appreciated Property to Public Charities, in 4 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PH-
LANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, RESEARCH PAPERS
2551, 2551-52 (1977) (discussing history of permitting charitable contribution
deduction of appreciated fair market value).
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III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES
Having examined in detail the current laws that are pertinent
to copyrights and patents, a discussion of the relevant legislative
history to those laws is now in order. The examination of the
legislative histories will reveal why Congress enacted these laws,
or at least, what Congress has chosen to state as its reasons for
their enactment.
A. Capital Gain Concept
Congress introduced the concept of capital gain into the Tax
Code in the Revenue Act of 1921.195 In the general comment is-
sued by the House Ways and Means Committee, the House of
Representatives stated that the purpose of the Act was to reduce
rather than shift the tax burden because "[t]he reduction of tax
burdens is essential to business recovery ... "196
The predecessor to the present I.R.C. section 1221 was sec-
tion 206(a)(6) of the 1921 Code. 197 This section defined a "capi-
tal asset" to include property acquired and held by the taxpayer
for more than two years as an investment or for profit, whether or
not connected with his trade or business, but not property held
for personal use or inventory.' 98 The report of the Ways and
195. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
196. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1921). In setting forth the
purpose of the Revenue Act, the committee stated:
With few minor exceptions, new tax levies . . . have been avoided. In
the opinion of your committee the exacting of the present excessive
sums of taxes from the country contributes in no small degree to the
depressing influences under which business and industry in general are
staggering as an aftermath of the World War. The cost of the war, the
extent of its destruction, and the financial cost it occasions, is felt, not
during the period of combat but after the cessation of hostilities, at
which time the demand for war supplies terminates, with a resulting
shrinkage of values. The Nation is now passing through the trying pe-
riod of liquidation and readjustment. The reduction of the tax burdens
is essential to business recovery. ...
Id.
197. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 233
(1921); see I.R.C. § 1221 (1982) Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98,
§ 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 233 (1921).
198. Id. This section provided in full:
The term "capital assets" as used in this section means property
acquired and held by the taxpayer for profit or investment for more
than two years (whether or not connected with his trade or business),
but does not include property held for the personal use or consump-
tion of the taxpayer or his family, or stock in trade of the taxpayer or
other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inven-
tory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year.
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Means Committee stated that this section was necessary because
sales were retarded. 99 The gain earned over a number of years
was taxed as a lump sum in the year of realization.200 The pur-
pose of section 206(a)(6) was to permit a transaction to be com-
pleted without the prohibitive tax.20 ' The Senate Finance
Committee's report reiterated this purpose and added that this
section limited the rate of taxation on gain derived from a sale of
a capital asset by providing that only forty percent of the net gain
derived would be taxed.202
The congressional discussions which followed the presenta-
tion of this provision and other related provisions serve to illumi-
199. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921), reprinted in SEID-
MAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1961 at 813
(1938). In its report, the committee found that "[t]he sale of farms, mineral
properties, and other capital assets is now seriously retarded .. " Id.
200. Id. The committee stated that the reason for the retardation of sales
was:
that gains and profits earned over a series of years are under the pres-
ent law taxed on a lump sum . . . in the year in which the profit is
realized. Many such sales, with their possible profit taking and conse-
quent increase of the tax revenue, have been blocked by this feature of
the present law.
Id. at 10-11, reprinted in SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX
LAWS, 1938-1961, at 813 (1938).
201. Id. at 11, reprinted in SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL IN-
COME TAX LAWS 1938-1961, at 813 (1938). The committe explained:
In order to permit such transactions to go forward without fear of a
prohibitive tax, the proposed bill, in section 206, adds a new section...
to the income tax, providing that where the net gain derived from the
sale or other disposition of capital assets would, under the ordinary
procedure, be subjected to an income tax in excess of 15 per cent, the
tax upon capital net gain shall be limited to that rate. It is believed that
the passage of this provision would materially increase the revenue, not
only because it would stimulate profit-taking transactions but because
the limitation of 15 per cent is also applied to capital losses. Under
present conditions there are likely to be more losses than gains.
Id.
202. S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1921), reprinted in SEIDMAN'S
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1961, at 814 (1938).
The Senate Committee stated that:
Section 206 limits the rate of taxation upon gain derived from the sale
of capital assets. Under the present law many sales of farms, mineral
properties, and other capital assets have been prevented by the fact that
gains and profits earned over a series of years are ... taxed as a lump
sum and the amount of surtax excessively enhanced thereby. In order
to permit such transactions to take place without fear of prohibitive tax,
section 206 provides that only 40 per cent of the net gain derived from
the sale or other disposition of capital assets shall be taken into account
in determining the net income upon which the income tax is imposed.
This automatically reduces the rate of taxes applicable to such income
by 60 per cent.
9751986]
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nate the capital gain concept generally. Senator Walsh of
Massachusetts had difficulty understanding why a lawyer or any
other professional person who derived a fee from a large case was
taxed for the full amount, while a speculator who derived the
same amount of income from the New York Stock Exchange
would only be taxed on forty percent. 203 He continued to state
that if this proposal had any merit at all, then fairness to other
taxpayers demanded that there should be a required holding
period. 20 4
B. The Revenue Act of 1950: Exclusion of Copyrights From Definition
of Capital Asset
The Revenue Act of 1950 made several amendments to the
capital asset definitional sections of the Code which were particu-
larly harmful to authors and artists. These amendments formed
the backdrop for Congress' enactment of section 1235, in 1954,
which once and for all evidenced Congress' desire to benefit in-
ventors at the expense of authors and artists.20 5
Prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1950, the main
hazard an author or artist faced in qualifying for capital gain treat-
203. 61 CONG. REC. § 6575 (1921) (statement of Senator Walsh). In his
remarks to the Senate, Senator Walsh specifically stated:
... [t]he abuses that can grow out of the proposed change would seem
to argue very strongly against the insertion of this clause without some
modification in the pending bill. There is no distinction made between
increased value in tangible or intangible property extending over a
long period of years and that sudden and speculative increase that de-
velops within a short period of time. Under this amendment the stock
speculator who buys early in the year stocks at a small valuation and
sells them later at a much enhanced value would have to pay a tax on
only 40 per cent of the gain from such sales, while gains in income from
every other source of income would be taxed to the full amount.
Under the proposed amendment and bill a lawyer or any other
professional man who derived as a fee from a large case or a merchant
who through a substantial increase in sales derived an income of, say,
$100,000 per year is taxable upon the full amount of income. The
speculator who derives an income of $100,000 a year upon the New
York Stock Exchange or in any other manner would be taxable only on
40 per cent of his net income, or $40,000.
Id. (statement of Senator Walsh).
204. Id. Senator Walsh proposed that:
[I]n all fairness and equity to taxpayers other than those who are mak-
ing money in a speculative way upon sudden increases in the value of
property which they hold that there should be a limit in the time al-
lowed for holding capital assets before the reduced rate of taxation
would be applicable .... a time limit of at least three years.
Id. (statement of Senator Walsh).
205. For a discussion of the purpose and history of section 1235, see Mott,
supra note 24, at 151-52; see also supra note 6 (Text of I.R.C. § 1235).
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ment when he disposed of his property was the provision which
withheld capital gain treatment for property held by the taxpayer
"primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness." 20 6 A professional author or inventor was deemed to hold
the products of his efforts as goods for sale in his business so that
he was, therefore, not eligible for capital gain treatment when he
transferred that property. 20 7 On the other hand, an amateur au-
thor or inventor in the field who produced and sold only a few
works might be deemed to realize capital gain on the sale or ex-
change of his works since he was not "in the business" of produc-
ing and selling his works.208
To avoid this loophole which was available to amateur au-
thors and artists, the Revenue Act of 1950 specifically excluded
from the definition of capital asset all copyrighted property (and
all property which might be entitled to copyright protection)
which was held by a taxpayer whose personal efforts created the
property or by a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such prop-
erty is determined by reference to the basis in the hands of the
creator.2 0 9 Section 206(a)(6) of the 1921 Code had come under
the rubric of section 117 of the 1939 Code: Capital Gains and
Losses.2 10 The 1950 bill which finally passed through the House
amended the definition of "capital asset" to read: "The term
'capital assets' does not include...
206. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 151(b), 56 Stat. 798, 846
(1942) (enacting I.R.C. § 117(j)). Under I.R.C. § 117(j)(1) (the predecessor sec-
tion to section 1231(b)), "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business was expressly excluded
from the statutory definition of "property used in the trade or business." Reve-
nue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 151(b), 56 Stat. 798, 846. Such property,
therefore, was denied the benefits of section 117(j)(2) which treated a taxpayer's
gains and losses from dispositions of section 1170) business assets as long-term
capital gains and losses if the total gains exceeded the total losses. Id. The
current I.R.C. section 1231(a) makes similar provisions for such treatment of
business assets. See I.R.C. § 1231(a) (Supp. III 1985).
207. 3BJ. MERTENS, supra note 15, at § 22.19.
208. Id.; see also Herwig v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 384 (Ct. Cl. 1952)
(author realized capital gain on the sale of her novel since she did not hold such
property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business); Te-
Linde, 18 T.C. 91 (1952) (author realized capital gain upon the sale of his work);
Filpel, TAX LAW., supra note 60. For a further discussion of the TeLinde case, see
supra notes 130-136 and accompanying text.
209. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 210, 64 Stat. 906, 932-33,
reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 509-10 (amending Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1 § 117(a)(1), 53 Stat. 1, 50 (1939)) (emphasis
added).
210. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98 § 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 233
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(C) a patent [deleted] or copyright; an invention
[deleted] or design [deleted] a literary, musical, or artis-
tic composition; or similar property; held by-
(i) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created
such property .... 211
The report of the House Ways and Means Committee reveals
that Congress intended to exclude from the definition of a capital
asset all property held by any taxpayer whose personal efforts had
created it.212 Patents as well as copyrights were added to the ex-
clusion of section 117 and, therefore, excluded from the defini-
tion of "capital asset."213  The House did away with the
distinction between an amateur author or inventor and a profes-
sional author or inventor, stating that "a person who devises an
invention or who writes a book or creates some other sort of artis-
tic work will be taxed at ordinary income rates .... whether it is
his first product in the field or not." 21 4 The House apparently
wanted to close the loophole which allowed any amateur, whether
author or inventor, to realize capital gain.
The Senate Finance Committee referred to the 1950 bill as
211. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 210(a), 64 Stat. 906, 932
(1950), reprinted in SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND Ex-
CESS PROFITS TAX LAWS: 1953-1939, at 1763 (1954) (emphasis added).
As a point of interest, the amendment to close the "amateur" loophole has
been referred to as the "Eisenhower Amendment" because its introduction was
stimulated by the capital gain realized by General Eisenhower as an amateur
author on the sale of his book, Crusade in Europe. 3BJ. MERTENS, supra note 15, at
§ 22.19 n.7; see also Mott, supra note 24, at 150-51, Pilpel, TAX LAW, supra note
60, at 76.
212. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1950), reprinted in SEID-
MAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAWS:
1953-1939, at 1764 (1954) (emphasis added). The Committee Report stated:
The definition of the term "capital assets" has been ... amended
to exclude certain property created by the personal efforts or exertions
of the taxpayer. Under the committee amendment a person who de-
vises an invention or who writes a book or creates some other sort of
artistic work will be taxed at ordinary income rates, rather than at capi-
tal gains rates, upon gain from the sale of the work....
Id.
213. Id. The Committee Report further explained that:
. . . the bill lists specifically patients [sic], copyrights, inventions, de-
signs, and literary, musical, or artistic compositions as property in-
tended to be excluded from the capital asset category. The amendment
will also exclude any property similar to that specifically named; for ex-
ample, a formula or a radio program which has been created by the
personal efforts of the taxpayer.
Id.
214. Id.
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one which included many "loophole-closing measures.- 21 5 This
was particularly important since there was a need at that time to
raise taxes because of the war in Korea. 21 6 However, the Senate,
in its report, did not include patents in the exclusionary language
of section 117 and, therefore, did not exclude patents from the
definition of a capital asset. Rather, it spoke only of the person
"in the profession of writing books or creating other artistic
works" and stated that the income from the sale of products cre-
ated by personal effort should be taxed as ordinary income. 21 7
The Senate Finance Committee agreed that the policy of taxing
the products of an artist's personal efforts should apply to the am-
ateur artist as well, who, under the present tax structure, could
avail himself of a loophole if he held his creation for six
months. 218 He could then sell it and realize capital gain treat-
ment. 2 19 Furthermore, to avoid another loophole, any gain real-
ized by a person who acquired the artistic work as a gift from the
artist could be taxed as ordinary income. 220
When the Senate Finance Committee report finally made
mention of patents and inventions, it was to say that the proposed
House bill wrongly excluded those assets from the definition of
capital asset. The Finance Committee believed that the "desira-
bility of fostering the work of such inventors outweight[ed] the
215. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.
CODE CONG. SERVICE 3053.
216. Id. The Senate Finance Committee found that "[m]ilitary action in Ko-
rea coupled with substantial increases in defense and related expenditure has
made it necessary to convert the excise tax reduction bill passed by the House in
June of this year into a bill to raise revenues." Id.
217. Id. at 3097. The committee stated that:
When a person is in the profession of writing books, of creating
other artistic works, his income from the sale of the products of his
work is taxed as ordinary income. This is true whether he receives roy-
alties from the use of his products or sells them outright, since the
products of his work are held by him "primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of his trade or business" and are, therefore, not
treated as capital assets.
Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. The Finance Committee Report explained that:
If an amateur receives royalties on his book or other artistic work,
they are treated as ordinary income, but if he holds his book or other
artistic work for 6 months . . . and then sells it outright he can avail
himself of a loophole which treats such a sale as the sale of a capital
asset, not held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
the taxpayer's trade or business. As a result the taxpayer receives long-
term capital gain treatment on the product of his personal effort.
220. Id.
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small amount of additional revenue which might be obtained
under the House bill .... ,,221 Therefore, the words "invention,"
"patent," and "design" were eliminated from the proposed
bill. 222
At the Senate Hearings on the Revenue Revisions of 1950,223
statements were made by various individuals and groups which
greatly influenced the Finance Committee's decision to delete
"patents and inventions" from the bill proposed by the House
Ways and Means Committee. The table of contents to the hear-
ings indicates that the arts were not well represented. Those who
did appear to support the arts were individuals primarily involved
with the performing arts. In fact, an examination of their state-
ments reveals that they were present at the hearings to object to a
proposed ticket sales tax rather than to lobby for the same prefer-
ential treatment granted to inventors. 224
On the other hand, small business and industry were repre-
sented by the Council for Independent Business and by the Pat-
ent Association, each of which made statements pertinent to the
proposed bill to exclude patents from the definition of capital as-
sets. Mr. C.E. Earle, Secretary-Treasurer of the Council for In-
dependent Businesses and President of Breco Manufacturing
Company, announced that individuals engaged in the production
of wealth in this country under the protection of the patent sys-
tem were "very alarmed" by the bill which "would prohibit an
inventor from treating his patent as a capital asset." 225 In Mr.
221. Id. at 3098.
222. Id.
223. Revenue Revisions of 1950, Hearings on H.R. 8920: An Act to Reduce
Excise Taxes and for Other Purposes, Before the Committee on Finance United States Senate,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
224. See id at 165. In her statement before the Finance Committee, Helen
M. Thompson, Manager of the Charleston Symphony Orchestra and Secretary-
Treasurer of the American Symphony Orchestra League, expressed the "grave
financial need for the proposed exemption" of nonprofessional orchestras from
"the twenty percent Federal excise tax on admission tickets to our concerts."
Id.; see aLo id. at 170. Representing the League of New York Theatres and the
National Association of the Legitimate Theater, James F. Reilly stated that relief
should be given the entertainment industry "by way of an exemption" from the
ticket sales tax. Id.
225. Id. at 601-02 (statement of C.E. Earle). Mr. Earle also stated that:
[Tihe experts who wrote this provision call it plugging up a loophole.
Permitting an inventor to get some reward for his invention is not my
idea of a loophole. As for 'plugging up', it will certainly effectively plug
up the inventor's desire to create new and better things for our people
to enjoy.
Id. at 605. Mr. Earle continued by stating that "the inventor flourishes and
980 [Vol. 31: p. 931
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Earle's opinion, "inventions [were] wholly an industrial tool." 22 6
He further added that the amount of revenue raised by taxation
of patents when treated as ordinary income assets was slight. 227
Tax attorney Allan Higgins also stated that the bill before the
Senate which proposed to tax the proceeds of all patents and
copyrights by inventors and authors was "discriminatory, arbi-
trary, and a great discouragement to inventive and creative genius
in the United States. '228 Furthermore, he concluded, in order to
maintain the United States' lead in scientific advancement, inven-
tors should be given every encouragement possible. 229
The statement submitted by the American Patent Law Asso-
ciation in opposition to the proposed provisions of the bill also
appealed to the potential danger of stifling inventive ingenuity.230
In retrospect, it is apparent that the lobbying efforts of the propo-
brings forth fruit when he feels that he is being nurtured in an atmosphere of
freedom and a soil rich in opportunity." Id.
226. Id. at 605 (statement of C.E. Earle). Moreover, added Mr. Earle:
Our patent system is responsible, to a large degree, for the tremen-
dous and rapid growth of the industrial phase of our economy.
Although the individual inventor has never been properly rewarded for
his advanced thinking, vision, and personal efforts, he deserves the ma-
jor part of the credit for this great progress. His type of thinking
should be encouraged rather than discouraged.
Id. at 603 (statement of C.E. Earle).
227. Id. at 605 (statement of C.E. Earle). Mr. Earle asserted that:
If patents produce their proportionate share, it will only amount to
a couple of hundred thousand dollars. [sic]. For this comparatively
picayune sum we would discourage our individual inventor by putting a
ceiling over his opportunities, thus inhibiting his desire to create by
depriving him of the major part of the reward, which is already pitifully
small. So the end result will be to deny the economy of this nation
many inventions potentially worth millions of dollars, to say nothing of
the loss of patent stimuli to our industrial developments.
Id. Mr. Earle concluded by "respectfully and urgently" requesting the Senate
Finance Committee "to delete the words 'a patent or an invention or design'
from the proposed bill." Id.
228. Id. at 607 (statement of Allan H.W. Higgins).
229. Id. at 608 (statement of Allan H.W. Higgins). Mr. Higgins suggested
that, "[i]n these times, when it is so important for the United States to keep the
lead in new scientific development in all fields, inventors, especially, should be
given every encouragement possible rather than be subjected to a new arbitrary
tax provision which will dull and discourage their inventive genius." Id.
230. Id. at 680 (statement of American Patent Law Association). The Asso-
ciation stated that the proposed bill:
would be discriminatory against inventors and would work a hardship
tending to retard rather than stimulate inventive ingenuity ... [it]
would strike hardest at the 'little inventor' who in many instances works
for many years on the development of an idea which when brought to
fruition may be, and often is, the only invention of value which he pro-
duces in his lifetime. If he is fortunate enough to sell his invention or
the patent which he obtains on it, it would be manifestly unfair to make
1986]
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nents of the patent system were not in vain since the Senate Fi-
nance Committee acquiesced and deleted the words "patent,"
"invention," and "design" from the proposed bill, using the rea-
soning of the lobbyists to justify its actions. 23 1
Besides the loophole for amateur artists, Congress plugged
other loopholes with the Revenue Act of 1950. Section 341 of the
present Code232 had it genesis in this Act as section 117(m) of the
amended 1939 Code. 233 This provision defined a collapsible cor-
poration as a device whereby one or more individuals attempts to
convert his profits to long-term capital gain. This is accomplished
by forming a corporation principally for the production or con-
struction of property, with a view to distribution before the cor-
poration realizes a substantial part of the net income to be
derived from the property.2 34 Section 117(m)(1) further pro-
vided that the gain from the sale or exchange of stock of a collaps-
ible corporation would be treated as a sale or exchange of
him pay tax on the entire amount received as income rather than as sale
of a capital asset.
231. 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 3097-98. The legislative history of the
Revenue Act of 1950 reveals that the deletion of the words "invention," "pat-
ent," and "design" was due to the belief "that the desirability of fostering the
work of [occasional] inventors outweighs the small amount of additional revenue
which might be obtained .... " Id. at 3098.
232. I.R.C. § 341 (1982). -
233. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 212(a), 64 Stat. 906, 934-
35 (enacting I.R.C. § 117(m)). The purpose of section 117(m) was to close a
loophole that Congress feared could be used to convert ordinary income into
capital gain. See Braunstein v. Commission, 36 T.C. 22, aff'd, 305 F.2d 949 (2d
Cir. 1962), aff'd, 374 U.S. 65 (1963).
234. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 212, 64 Stat. 906, 934-35,
(enacting I.R.C. § 117(m)), reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 512. Sec-
tion 117(m), as added by the 1950 Revenue Act, provided, in pertinent part:
(2) Definitions-
(A) For the purposes of this subsection, the term 'collapsible
corporation' means a corporation formed or availed of principally
for the manufacture, construction, or production of property, or
for the holding of stock in a corporation so formed or availed of,
with a view to-
(i) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders
(whether in liquidation or otherwise), or a distribution to
its shareholders, prior to the realization by the corpora-
tion manufacturing, constructing, or producing the prop-
erty of a substantial part of the net income to be derived
from such property, and
(ii) the realization by such shareholders of gain attribu-
table to such property.
Id. For the text of the current code section dealing with collapsible corpora-
tions, see infra note 287.
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property which was not a capital asset.2 3 5 This new section
117(m) prevented artists from forming a corporation which held
their works as assets and then selling their shares in the corpora-
tion in order to realize long-term capital gain.
Another plugged loophole, also at the expense of artists, was
the amendment of section 1170) of the 1939 Code, the precursor
to the present section 1231(b).2 36 Section 1170) was entitled
"Gains and Losses from Involuntary Conversion and from Sales
or Exchanges of Certain Property Used in the Trade or Busi-
ness."23 7 In 1950, Congress amended section 1 170) by excluding
from the definition of "property used in the trade or business"
copyrights and literary, musical or artistic compositions and simi-
lar property in the hands of a taxpayer whose personal efforts cre-
235. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 212, 64 Stat. 906, 934-35.
Section 117(m)(1) provided that:
(1) Treatment of gain to shareholders-gain from the sale or ex-
change (whether in liquidation or otherwise) of stock of a collapsible
corporation, to the extent that it would be considered (but for the pro-
visions of this subsection) as gain from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset held for more than 6 months, shall be considered as gain from the,
sale or exchange of property which is not a capital asset.
Id.
In its report, the Senate Finance Committee stated that the device of the
collapsible corporation had been used primarily by the motion-picture industry.
See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERVICE 3099. For a further discussion of use of the collapsible corporation by
artists, see infra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
236. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 210, 64 Stat. 906, 933
(amending Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 42-753, § 15 1(b), 56 Stat. 798, 846
(1942)), reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 510. Section 117(j) of the
1939 Code was thus amended to provide as follows:
(0) Gains and losses from involuntary conversion and from the sale or
exchange of certain property used in the trade or business.
(1) Definition of property used in the trade or business-For the pur-
pose of this subsection, the term "property used in the trade or busi-
ness" means property used in the trade or business, of a character
which is subject to the allowance for depreciation ..... held for more
than six months, which is not (A) property of a kind which would be
properly includible in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the
close of the taxable year, or (B) property held by the taxpayer primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business, or
(C) a copyright, a literary, musical or artistic composition, or similar
property, held by a taxpayer described in subsection (a)(1)(c). (A tax-
payer whose personal efforts created such property or a taxpayer whose
basis in such property is determined with reference to the basis of such
property in the hands of the person whose personal efforts created such
property) (explanation added).
Id.
237. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 42-753, § 151(b), 56 Stat. 798, 846
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ated such property. 238
To summarize, the Revenue Act of 1950 effectively excluded
copyrights, literary, musical or artistic compositions and similar
property held by a creator or his donee (or employer) from the
definition of "capital assets." In so doing, Congress made sure
that the loophole available to amateur authors no longer existed
so that both amateur and professional authors would realize ordi-
nary income upon a sale or exchange of their creations. Congress
also plugged the loophole whereby an artist could utilize a col-
lapsible corporation to turn his income into capital gain. And fi-
nally, Congress excluded copyrights and other artistic creations
from the definition of property used in a trade or business which
might be eligible for long-term capital gain treatment.
C. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Sale or Exchange of Patents
In the general comment to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954,239 the House report stated that the purpose of the changes
in the Code was "to remove inequities, to end harassment of the
taxpayer and to reduce tax barriers to future expansion of pro-
duction and employment." 240 These modifications in the Code
were to act as incentives for economic growth. 24 1 The House ad-
ded that these provisions were important for the survival of small
businesses. 242
238. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 210, 64 Stat. 906, 933
(amending Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 42-753, § 151(b), 56 Stat. 798, 846
(1942)), reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 510. For the text of section
117(j), see supra note 235.
The Report of the Senate Finance Committee explained that the amend-
ment "excluded copyrights and literary, musical, or artistic compositions, and
similar property in the hands of certain taxpayers from ...the definition of
'property used in a trade or business' which is entitled to the benefits of section
117 ...." S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 27-28, reprinted in 1 SEIDMAN'S
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAwS: 1953-
1939, at 1808 (1954).
239. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 1
(1954).
240. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025.
241. Id. The Committee Report stated that:
The restrictive effects of the present tax law on economic growth
have been obscured and somewhat offset during the past decade by the
inflationary pressures of the war and postwar periods. It is now appar-
ent that prompt adoption of this new tax law is especially timely in or-
der to create an environment in which normal incentives can operate to
maintain normal economic growth . . . . Its passage will lead to in-
creased employment and a higher standard of living.
Id.
242. Id. at 4026. The Committee Report specifically explained that:
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Thus, to remove inequities and to end harassment, Congress
enacted section 1235 to help individual inventors and paten-
tors.24 3 The House placed patents under the rubric of certain
special types of assets.244 Section 1235 was designed to do away
with the "confusing and arbitrary" distinctions between amateur
and professional inventors and between royalty payments and
fixed sum payments. 245 The House stated that the provision was
intended to obviate the difficulty of determining whether an in-
ventor had sufficient prior inventions to qualify it as a salein the
ordinary course of business. 246 Furthermore, according to the
House interpretation, an amateur inventor who transferred his
patent or invention in exchange for royalty payments would real-
ize only ordinary income before the 1954 Act, whereas an ama-
teur inventor who transferred his patent for a fixed sum realized
long-term capital gain. 24 7 As a result, under section 1235, both
The bill contains many provisions which are important to the
growth and survival of small business. These include more adequate
depreciation, a more realistic policy with respect to retained earnings,
more liberal provision for research and development expenditures, a
stimulus to equity financing through dividend relief, recognition of
business practices for tax accounting purposes, and simplified proce-
dures for partnerships and corporate reorganizations.
Id.
243. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 1235, 68A Stat.
1, 329-30. For the text of section 1235, see supra note 6.
244. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025, 4108.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 4422. The committee further explained that:
Under existing law, only amateur as distinct from professional in-
ventors can obtain capital gain treatment; and, to make this distinction,
it has become necessary to determine whether sufficient prior inven-
tions exist to warrant placing the taxpayer in the business of selling
inventions to customers, a requirement that has in many instances
caused confusion and litigation. To alleviate this difficulty in the case
of gain, and to provide a larger incentive to all inventors to contribute
to the welfare of the nation, this section is applicable equally to all in-
ventors, whether amateur or professional, regardless how often they
sell their patents. ...
Id.
247. Id. The Committee Report stated that:
Under present law an amateur inventor may receive capital gains
treatment on the outright sale of his patent but a professional may not.
However, if a sale arrangement results in royalty income, rather than
installment payments, even an amateur inventor receives ordinary in-
come tax treatment.
The present distinction between amateur and professional inven-
tors and between royalty income and installment payments is both arbi-
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amateur and professional inventors were given the preference of
being able to realize long-term capital gain upon the transfer of
their inventions whether they received royalty or fixed sum
payments.
The Senate Finance Committee's revision of the House bill
inserted a provision that eliminated the need for any holding pe-
riod upon a transfer of property. This provision stated "that a
transfer... of all substantial rights evidenced by a patent... shall
be deemed a sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more
than six months .... ,,248 The Senate Finance Committee also
added that an assignment or exclusive license of the patent would
be deemed to constitute a "sale or exchange" for tax purposes.2 49
In further clarifying which taxpayers were entitled to the benefits
of this provision, the Finance Committee said that the section was
limited to "holders" who were individuals "whose efforts created
the patent property transferred, by which is meant the 'first and
original' inventor .... ,250
So, to do away with the confusing and arbitrary distinctions
248. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 5082. The Finance Committee explained that this six
month holding period would be applied "regardless of whether or not payments
in consideration of such transfer are payable periodically over a period generally
coterminous with the transferee's use of the patent or are contingent on the
productivity, use, or disposition of the property transferred." Id. In 1954, six
months was the holding period necessary in order for a taxpayer to realize capi-
tal gain in the transfer of a capital asset.
249. Id. In elaborating on its decision to treat an assignment or exclusive
license as a sale or exchange, the Finance Committee stated that:
The section does not detail precisely what constitutes the formal
components of a sale or exchange of patent rights beyond requiring
that all substantial rights evidenced by the patent ... should be trans-
formed to the transferee for consideration .... [E]xclusive licenses to
manufacture, use, and sell for the life of the patent, are considered to
be 'sales or exchanges' because, in substantive effect, all 'right, title,
and interest' in the patent property is transferred.
Id. at 5082-83.
250. Id. at 5083. The Finance Committee further explained that it was:
desirous of extending the scope of this section to cover (in addition to
inventors) those individuals who contribute financially toward the de-
velopment of the invention. Accordingly, paragraph (2) of subsection
(b) also includes within the definition of 'holder' any other individual
who acquired his interest in such property in exchange for considera-
tion in money or money's worth (i.e., consideration capable of present
valuation in monetary terms) actually paid to the creator prior to the
time when the invention (to which the patent rights relate) is actually
reduced to practice ....
Id. The definition of "holder," however, was not to apply to "any individual who
is either an employer of any creator or related to any such creator .... " Id. For
the complete text of section 1235, see supra note 6.
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between amateur and professional inventors, Congress enacted a
provision which gives the preferential treatment of long-term cap-
ital gain to the amateur inventor who receives a fixed sum pay-
ment as well as to the amateur inventor who receives royalty
payments. 25' Furthermore, because the distinction between an
amateur inventor and a professional inventor was confusing, Con-
gress included them both within the definition of a "holder" enti-
tled to the benefits of section 1235.252 Finally, to make certain
that there was enough of an incentive, Congress eliminated the
need for any holding period.253 It is interesting that in the legis-
lative history to the Revenue Act of 1950, Congress stated that
the policy behind the enactment of section 1221(3) was to ex-
clude from the definition of a capital asset those creations which
were the result of personal efforts. 254 Furthermore, to do away with
the confusing distinction between an amateur author and a pro-
fessional author, Congress, in 1950, denied the preferential treat-
ment to both. And to insure that the creator (first and original
author) of the copyrighted property could not realize any capital
gain on a sale or exchange or even on involuntary conversion of
his creations, Congress excluded copyrights held by their creators
from the definition of property used in a trade or business. Yet,
in the face of these curtailments, Congress, in 1954, enacted a
statute which gives the inventor the very preferences it has denied
the author.
IV. WHY SUCH TREATMENT?
A. Congressional Power to Issue Copyrights and Patents Arises From
Same Constitutional Grant
Congress derives its power to enact laws to benefit the sci-
ences and the arts from one clause in the Constitution: "[Con-
gress shall enact laws] to promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts, by securing for a limited time to Authors and Inven-
251. For a discussion of the prior tax treatment of amateurs who received
royalty or fixed sum payments for their patents, see supra notes 128-34 and ac-
companying text.
252. For a discussion of the policy of the Revenue Act of 1950 in excluding
from the definition of capital assets creations resulting from one's personal ef-
forts, see supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
253. For a discussion of the necessity for a holding period for capital assets,
see the statements of Senator Walsh, supra note 204 and accompanying text.
254. For a discussion of the policy of the Revenue Act of 1950 in excluding
from the definition of capital assets creations resulting from one's personal ef-
forts, see supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
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tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies." 2 55  But Congress, through its policies, has given only
inventors the preferential treatment of long-term capital gain
upon an exchange of their inventions. Under the guise of another
policy ("loophole closing measures"), it denies this preferential
treatment to authors. Thus, it profits the author little to hold the
exclusive right to his writings which Congress grants him, when
an unfair share of the proceeds of that exclusive right are taxed
out of his hands as soon as he receives them. 2 56
B. Both Patents and Copyrights Result from Personal Efforts of Creator
A major discrimination in the Tax Code derives from the dis-
tinction which Congress draws between the "personal efforts" of
an author and the "efforts" of a holder of an invention. This dis-
tinction is of minimal import since both patents and copyrights
are the result of the personal efforts of their creators. Yet, only
the inventor receives capital gain treatment under the Code.
Congress stated that section 1235 was enacted as an incentive to
inventors to contribute to the national welfare. 25 7 If contribution
to the national welfare was a significant policy consideration, then
how can Congress justifiably deprive creators of art, literature
and music of the benefits it bestowed upon inventors?258
255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
256. Pilpel, Development in the Tax Law, supra note 60, at 271. Ms. Pilpel
notes that there is no justification for the discrepancy in tax treatment of copy-
rights and patents particularly in light of the fact that the founding fathers con-
sidered patents and copyrights to be in the same category. Id. at 276. The
author goes on to question the judgment behind offering incentives to create to
inventors but not to authors. Id. She concludes that in society's rush toward
increased scientific knowledge, perhaps society has come to "value things more
than words, gadgets more than concepts." Id.
257. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4629, 5082. This legislative history states in part that
"prompt adoption of this new tax law is especially timely in order to create an
environment in which normal incentives can operate to maintain normal eco-
nomic growth." Id. at 4629. Section 1235 is also discussed in detail. See id. at
5081-84.
The House Report also discusses section 1235. See H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4025, 4421-
24. The report notes that section 1235 is meant "to provide a larger incentive to
all inventors to contribute to the welfare of the nation..." Id. at 4422.
258. See Eulenberg, supra note 60. Professor Eulenberg discusses the his-
tory of capital gains treatment and its tax consequences. Id. at 1174. He then
notes the specific exclusion of copyrights from the definition of capital assets
and the granting of capital characterization to patents. Id. at 1175-76. The au-
thor notes that while the House Ways and Means Committee proposed to ex-
clude both copyrights and patents from the definition of capital assets, the
Senate chose to exclude only copyrights. Id. at 1176. The author suggests that
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C. Differences in Tax Treatment Due to Ad Hoc Reactions to Political
and Economic Events
One commentator has suggested that the differences in the
tax treatment of copyrights and patents are the result of legisla-
tion based on ad hoc reactions to political and economic events,
rather than attempts to establish a consistent tax structure.2 59
For example, before the Revenue Act of 1950, General Eisen-
hower sold a book for one million dollars which he authored and
published, called Crusades in Europe. As an amateur author, he was
taxed on his profit realized as long-term capital gain. Congress
disapproved of this treatment, and reacted by excluding copy-
rights held by their creators from the definition of capital as-
sets. 260 This amendment had the widespread result of depriving
professional and amateur authors of the opportunity to recognize
long-term capital gain upon a sale of their works.
When Congress was in the process of amending this part of
the Code, inventors were also threatened by the same bill that
would have excluded patents as well as copyrights from the defi-
nition of capital assets. But the inventors were represented at the
Senate hearings by lobbyists who successfully crusaded against
the proposed exclusion of patents. 26 1 Since the lobbying efforts
of those helping the artists did not focus on the same aspects of
the proposed bills, discriminatory treatment resulted.
Additional support for the proposition that ad hoc reaction
caused such disparity is Congress' policy to foster inventions
through tax incentives.2 62 This policy, as expressed in section
117(a)(1)(C) of the 1939 Code, the predecessor of section
1221(2), mandates ordinary income treatment for the creator.
However, Congress' policy of using tax incentives to foster inven-
tions has not been proven to materially increase inventive output.
The fluctuations in inventive output have, in fact, been inter-
preted to show no correlation to the changes in tax treatment.2 63
there is no rationale for this distinction and criticizes Congress for being "more
solicitous of the inventor of a gadget than the author of a book, however
profound and influential the book may be." Id. at 1173.
259. Note, supra note 24, at 1423.
260. See Pilpel, Development in the Tax Law, supra note 60, at 272. For a fur-
ther discussion of the "Eisenhower amendment," see supra note 207.
261. For a further discussion of the Senate hearings, see supra notes 222-
29.
262. This policy, of course, contradicts Congress' attitude towards the per-
sonal efforts of the creator of property.
263. Note, supra note 24, at 1424 n.41. The author states:
At the House hearings in 1953, the patent interests submitted a
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D. Contrivances Needed by Holders of Copyrighted Property to Get
Long-term Capital Gain Treatment
To combat the discriminatory provisions in the Internal Rev-
enue Code, artists and authors are forced to resort to contriv-
ances such as contract rights and corporate formations in order to
obtain capital gain treatment upon a transfer of their work. These
contrivances evidence a need for eradicating the discriminatory
treatment.
In general, courts have denied capital gain treatment for the
sale of contract rights to receive money if a taxpayer has no ex-
pectation of profit from appreciation in his or her investment. 264
The taxpayer must hold the property himself. The right to share
in the profit of another person's property is not a capital asset.2 6 5
In the Ferrer case, 26 6 however, the court was willing to give
capital gain treatment to a sale of contract rights. The signifi-
cance of the Ferrer case was the court's willingness to fragment the
various rights Ferrer held in the contract between the author and
graph showing fluctuations in the number of patent applications from
1900 to 1950, and contended that the decline in applications from ap-
proximately 8.7 per 10,000 population in 1921 to 4.4 in 1949 could be
remedied by more favorable tax treatment. Hearings on a General Revi-
sion Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.,
(1953). But this contention is not supported by the graph. Between
1917 and 1921 applications increased from 5.9 to 8.7 per 10,000
although tax rates rose sharply over prior years. A decrease in applica-
tions after 1921 paralleled a decline in ordinary rates and the introduc-
tion of capital gain taxation. And between 1943 and 1946, when both
ordinary and capital gain rates had been increased, applications rose
from 3.3 to 5.5.
Id. (citations omitted).
264. See Utilities & Indust. Corp. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 888 (1964) (de-
nying capital gains treatment on sales of certain contract rights to receive money
because taxpayer had no expectation of profit from appreciation in value), modi-
fied, South Bay Corp. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1965); Hallcraft
Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 199 (1963), afftd, 336 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.
1964) (denying capital gain treatment on lump sum payment received by tax-
payer for sale of right to receive future income); see also Eustice, supra note 3, at
15. Professor Eustice noted that contract rights include only a potential For in-
come, contingent on the future profitability of the object of the rights and thus
subject to substantial economic risks of appreciation or depreciation. Id. Thus,
presumably, there is no expectation of profit. He further noted that "the nature
of the interest sold . . . controlled the capital gain issue." Id. at 15-16. He con-
cluded that the Ferrer decision represented a sound and significant departure
from prior law. Id. at 34.
265. See Eustice, supra note 63, at 17 ("The sale of a right to earn future
ordinary income . . . would seem to he taxable as ordinary income under the
spirit, if not the letter of the Ferrer tests").
266. For a flurther discussion of the F'errer case, see supra notes 87-103, 139-
44 & 151-53 and accompanying text.
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himself. If the court had not done so, the fact that this contract
provided Ferrer with a right to a contingent royalty interest of
future profits could have disqualified the entire contract from the
capital asset category under the doctrine of assignment of in-
come, or, because the contingent royalty could instead be consid-
ered as deferred compensation. In fact, after fragmenting the
contract rights, the only right which the court did not recognize
as producing long-term capital gain was precisely the contingent
royalty interest in any consideration received by the author for a
sale of his retained film rights. This was taxed to Ferrer as ordi-
nary income.
Futhermore, in Benny v. Commissioner,267 the taxpayer,
through a network of contracts, was able to sell his sixty percent
interest of the shares in a corporation which managed his televi-
sion show and realize long-term capital gain.2 68 The issue in
Benny was whether any part of the amount realized was compensa-
tion to be taxed as ordinary income. Benny was careful to ar-
range separate contracts. One contract was with the American
Tobacco Company for Benny's personal services, and a second
contract was between Benny's corporation (Amusement) and
American Tobacco which stipulated that Amusement would man-
age the Jack Benny Show for American Tobacco. When Benny
sold his stock in Amusement, he successfully argued that the
amount realized was long-term capital gain because he personally
held the contract with American tobacco for his personal services.
The Amusement Corporation, on the other hand, held the man-
agement contract which was its primary asset.
The Tax Court in Benny held that all the evidence established
"beyond doubt that the substance of the transaction in question
was accurately and completely reflected by the form in which it
occurred." 269 The court stated that the amount paid to Benny
was for stock in a "bona fide corporation." Therefore, the sale of
that stock was the sale of a capital asset which resulted in long-
term capital gain treatment.
In a 1982 Private Ruling,270 the Service also stated that a roy-
alty contract, received in exchange for an exclusive license to pub-
lish a non-fiction book, was income-producing property. This
267. Benny v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 197 (1955).
268. Id. at 198.
269. Id. at 208.
270. Private Ruling 8217037, supra note 85. For a further discussion of Pri-
vate Ruling 8217037, see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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contract could be transferred to trusts created to benefit the mi-
nor children of an author. The tax would then be shifted to the
trust. This Private Ruling indicates a willingness by the Service to
treat as property, royalty contracts received as consideration for
income-producing property.
Artists also circumvent some of the Tax Code's discrimina-
tory treatment by forming corporations. The corporate form of
doing business is a popular method of deferring and reducing the
tax burdens of popular entertainers. 27' The Benny case suggests
not only that artists may successfully establish contract rights, but
also that a corporation formed by a performing artist can be rec-
ognized by the courts as a bona fide corporation. 272
A more recent case, The Estate of Nathaniel (Nat King) Cole,273
reinforces the decision of the Benny court. The Cole case dealt
with an artist who did business as a corporation. The artist trans-
ferred to the corporation his previously created property. 274 The
corporation then served as a means for the disposition of that
property. 275 The artist, as an employee of the corporation, also
received a salary from the corporation for his services of creating
property during his employment.2 76 Thus, the benefit for the art-
ist was twofold: it was a vehicle for the disposition of previously
created property and it was an employer.2 77
Cole transferred to the corporation his rights to receive roy-
alties from the use of previously made master recordings, 278 and
he also agreed to make new recordings for the corporation.279
271. Beghe, supra note 83, at 509. Mr. Beghe notes the advantages for the
artist of the corporate form, including the opportunity to even out irregular per-
sonal income by regular salary payments. Id. at 510. He notes, however, that
the Commissioner has launched various attacks on this type of closely held cor-
poration. Id. at 511; see also Worthy, IRS Chief Counsel Outlines What Lies Ahead for
Professional Corporations, 32 J. TAX'N 88 (1970). While Mr. Beghe notes some
drawbacks to the corporate form, e.g., the expense, he concludes that its use
deserves serious consideration by the artist. Beghe, supra, at 514.
272. Benny v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 197, 210 (1955). See generally B. BITr-
KER &J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLD-
ERS (3d ed. 1971); 17, 17A and 17B; EATON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS,
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS (1970); Bertrans, Tax Problems of
the Straw Corporation, 20 VILL. L. REV. 735 (1974). For a further discussion of
Benny, see supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
273. Estate of Cole, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 313 (1973).
274. Id at 316.
275. Id. at 317.
276. Id.
277. Beghe, supra note 83, at 513.
278. Cole, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 313, 316-19 (1973).
279. Id. at 319.
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The Tax Court found that Cole's corporation had acquired in-
come-producing property (the royalty contracts) in an arms
length transaction,280 rejecting the Service's attempt to reallocate
the income under the assignment of income doctrine.28 ' The Cole
case is in accord with Benny on the issue of whether a corporation
set up by a performing artist to hold his contract rights will be
recognized by the courts as a bona fide corporation and not as a
sham created for tax avoidance.2 82
In 1959, the Service issued a Revenue Ruling 283 stating that
it would follow the decision of the Tax Court in Benny. 284 In Rev-
enue Ruling 59-325, the Service identified the issue in Benny as
whether a part of the amounts received for a sale of property was
in fact received as consideration for future services to be ren-
dered to the purchaser by the seller.2 85 In Benny, the Tax Court
found that the amounts received were for property transferred
(i.e., a sale of stock in a corporation).
Although performers have sometimes succeeded in forming
corporations in order to realize capital gains, the Service has
warned that it will carefully scrutinize any arrangement which ap-
pears to be a sale of personal services in the guise of a sale of a
capital asset to determine whether the substance of the arrange-
ment is a scheme for the avoidance of income tax. Furthermore,
whether the visual artist, as opposed to a performer, can, by form-
280. Id. at 324-25.
281. Id. at 325.
282. Accord Marx v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 88 (1957). The Marx case con-
cerned gains received on the sale of an interest in a partnership. Id. at 89. The
Service contended that a portion of the gain was compensation for service and
thus taxable as ordinary income. Id. at 99. The court disagreed, noting that this
was an arms-length sale for fair market value. Id. at 100. Thus, the court held
that the amount realized was taxable as capital gain. Id. at 101; see also Commis-
sioner v. O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376 (1955). In O'Brien, the court considered whether
the gain realized on the liquidation of a "collapsible" corporation is capital gain
or ordinary income and concluded that it was the former. Id. at 383. While the
court found the taxpayer's corporation to be collapsible, it also noted that such
corporate forms were widely used in the motion picture industry. Id. The court
concluded that the circumstances surrounding the enactment of a provision con-
cerning collapsible corporations (117(m) of the 1939 Code) left the courts free
to determine whether liquidation of such corporations resulted in capital gain or
ordinary income. Id. at 382-83. For a discussion of the enactment of section
117(m) of the 1939 Code, see supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
283. Rev. Rul. 59-325, 1959-2 C.B. 185.
284. In Rev. Rul. 59-325, the Service also indicated that it would follow the
Tax Court's decision in Marx. For a discussion of the Marx case, see supra note
281. While noting its willingness to follow the Benny and Marx decisions, the
Service cautioned that it would carefully scrutinize any arrangement which ap-
peared to be a tax avoidance scheme. Rev. Rul. 59-325, 1959-2 C.B. 185.
285. Id. Rev. Rul. 59-235, 1959-2 C.B. 186.
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ing a corporation to which he transfers his created works, realize
long-term capital gain upon the sale of his shares in such a corpo-
ration, has not yet been tested in court. 286 One commentator has
suggested that the successful visual artist might use a corporation
as a vehicle for the disposition of his current work and works
which he previously created and transferred to the corpora-
tion.28 7 Although this corporation could be deemed a collapsible
corporation under I.R.C. § 341,288 the artist might be able to gain
tax advantages because of section 341(b)(3) which states that col-
lapsible treatment does not apply to gain realized from the sale of
an item of property more than three years after the production of
that property is completed.2 89 Therefore, if the product is com-
pleted and transfered to the corporation three years prior to the
286. At least one visual artist has formed a corporation, presumably for
purposes of realizing long-term capital gains for his works. See Monroe, Prime
Property: Besides Being an Artist, Christo is Main Asset Claimed by CCJ Corp., Wall St. J.,
July 12, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
Christo v. Javacheff is an artist noted for doing "[u]nsung things in unusual
places." Id. For example, in a work that was called "running fences" he
stretched an eighteen foot high fence of woven nylon fabric, steel poles and
cables through the hill country of two California counties . I..." d. In another
project named "Surrounded Islands," he "surrounded eleven islands in Flor-
ida's Biscayne Bay with 6.4 million square feet of bright pink erosion control
fabric ...." Id.
The projects are expensive undertakings, and Christo and his wife formed
C.VJ. Corp. in 1971 to finance the projects. Id. C.V.J. pays Christo a salary for
his paintings and collages. C.V.J. then sells the paintings and collages to art
museums, private collectors and dealers. Id. The proceeds from such sales are
then used to finance Christo's more expensive projects. Id.
287. Beghe, supra note 83, at 510.
288. I.R.C. § 341 (1982). Section 341 provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he term "collapsible corporation" means a corporation formed or
availed of principally for the manufacture, construction, or production
of property, for the purchase of property which .. .is property [held]
... with a view to-
(A) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders . . .or a
distribution to its shareholders, before the realization by the corpora-
tion manufacturing, constructing, producing, or purchasing the prop-
erty of a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from such
property, and
(B) the realization by such shareholders of gain attributable to
such property.
Id. § 341(b)(1).
Mr. Beghe notes that the artist could time his transactions with the corpora-
tion to avoid collapsible treatment. Beghe, supra note 83, at 510. He cautions,
however, that such a device would be attacked by the Service. Id. at 510, n.88; see
also Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 234 (1964) (corpora-
tion set up to acquire a professional baseball team; collapsible corporation argu-
ment not asserted against selling shareholders on liquidation of corporation),
aff'd, 352 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1965), vacated, 383 U.S. 824 (1966).
289. I.R.C. § 341(b)(3) (1982).
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sale of stock, the artist should be able to realize capital gain upon
the sale of his shares.
However, despite the fact that such a corporation would not
be treated as collapsible, the Internal Revenue Service can still
attack corporations formed by artists. The Service can argue that
the corporate entity is a sham, that the corporation lacks corpo-
rate attributes; that the corporation is a personal holding com-
pany; that the corporation is an agent for the artist; or that Corn
Products applies because the stock is a business asset of the
artist. 290
The fact that artists resort to the transfer of contract rights
and to the costly and risky corporate form of doing business 29'
indicates their need to protect themselves from the heavy tax bur-
dens inflicted upon them.292 Treatment of copyrights as capital
assets would alleviate those burdens.
Inventors, on the other hand, do not worry about contriv-
ances such as the creation of contract rights or the formation of
corporations because of the benefits of section 1235. Section
1235 recognizes patent licensing as a sale. In the case of a fixed
sale of an invention, the section declares the invention to be a
capital asset. If the inventor cannot qualify under section 1235,
he can look to section 1231 for possible capital characterization.
And finally, the transfer of a patent license in exchange for con-
tingent payments also produces long-term capital gain under sec-
tion 1235 as long as all substantial rights to the patent or an
undivided interest in the patent are transferred. 293
Even a transfer of know-how gets the benefit of long-term
290. For an in depth discussion of the corporate form of doing business,
see Beghe, supra note 83. For a further discussion of Corn Products, see supra note
165 and accompanying text.
291. The corporate form does provide the traditional tax benefits of in-
come deferral, medical reimbursement, group life insurance, and other perks.
However, the artist whose corporation performs most of its services for only one
person runs the risk that the corporation may not be recognized for tax pur-
poses. See Cutrow, supra note 86, at 393-94.
In addition, because of the changing fiscal environment, the corporate form
is no longer essential in order to receive certain benefits which previously were
available only to corporations. For example, a change from the previous law no
longer requires incorporation in order for a taxpayer to receive the benefit of
qualified employee plans. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982), Cutrow, supra note 86, at 393-94.
292. See Monroe, supra note 285.
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capital gain treatment.294 Revenue Ruling 71-564 treats a fixed
price sale of know-how as property qualifying as a capital asset
under section 1221.295 In addition, exchanging a license for
know-how, like a patent license, will produce capital gain if all
substantial rights have been transferred.296 Furthermore, the cre-
ators of know-how qualify for research and experimental expense
deductions under section 174.297
E. Tax Risks in Seeking Classification
In light of the Tax Code's gross discrimination against the
creators of copyrightable property and its tremendously preferen-
tial treatment towards creators of patentable property and inven-
tions, one must closely scrutinize the distinction between that
which is copyrightable and that which is patentable, or at least
that which categorically falls within section 1235.298 If a taxpayer
294. See generally Cohen, supra note 46; Harding, supra note 46; Morreale,
supra note 46, at 566.
295. Rev. Rul. 71-564, 1971-2 C.B. 179. The ruling noted that the similar-
ity of secret know-how and patents warranted similar treatment. Id. The Service
cautioned that in order to qualify for capital treatment, the transfer of know-how
must be an unqualified transfer of all rights until the secret information becomes
public. Id. at 180.
296. See, e.g., Pickren v. United States, 378 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1967). In
Pickren, the taxpayer retained an absolute one-half interest in the know-how that
he transferred. Id. The Pickren court noted the similarity of patents and know-
how. Id. at 599. After looking at the contract of transference, the court con-
cluded that the parties did not intend a transfer of all the taxpayer's rights in the
know-how and that the income from the transfer was ordinary income. Id. at
601. The court noted that a transfer of all substantial rights would have received
capital treatment. Id. at 599.
297. See Morreale, supra note 46, at 564. Treasury Regulation § 1.174-
2(a)(l) provides definitions of research and experimental expenditures. Treas.
Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) (1960). The term 'research or experimental expenditure,'
as used in section 174, means expenditure incurred in connection:
with the taxpayer's trade or business which represent research and de-
velopment costs in the experimental or laboratory sense. The term
includes generally all such costs incident to the development of an ex-
perimental or pilot model, a plant process, a product, a formula, an
invention, or similar property, and the improvement of already existing
property of the type mentioned. The term does not include expendi-
tures such as those for the ordinary testing or inspection of materials or
products for quality control or those for efficiency surveys, manage-
ment studies, consumer surveys, advertising, or promotions. However,
the term includes the costs of obtaining a patent, such as attorneys' fees
expended in making and perfecting a patent application. On the other
hand, the term does not include the costs of acquiring another's patent,
model, production or process, nor does it include expenditures paid or
incurred for research in connection with literary, historical, or similar
projects.
Id.
298. See generally La Rue, Some Comparisons Between Copyright, Patent, Trade Se-
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can classify his creation as an invention or design, he may qualify
for the benefits of section 1235.
From a non-tax perspective, because patents take more time
to issue than copyrights thus delaying protection from infringe-
ment to an inventor, it is often more advantageous to try to qual-
ify a work as one which is protected by copyright. This is
especially true in the relatively new area of computer programs
which, due to their transitory nature, need immediate protection.
As a result of 1980 amendments to The Copyright Act of 1976
which specifically encompass computer programs, 299 there is
much confusion as to what is "new and useful as embodied in the
cret and Trademark Law, in LAW AND THE VISUAL ARTS. 147 (1974). Professor La
Rue finds no distinction which would justify the preferential treatment of patents
and not copyrights. Id.
A patent protects a tangible invention or discovery which embodies any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement. The criteria for a patent to issue are novelty, utility
and nonobviousness. Once issued, the patent lasts for 17 years, which enables
the inventor to exclude all others from making and using the invention even if
independently discovered. The patent application must be filed within one year
from public disclosure of the invention to protect it. Infringement is proved by
showing substantial similarity. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
The requirements of the Copyright Act of 1976, on the other hand, require
that the work be "fixed" in a tangible medium and that it have "originality of
authorship." A copyright protects the creator against another's copying the
work. But another person can independently create a similar or even identical
work. Copyright protection is obtained by placing a notice of copyright, the
name of the owner of the copyright, and the date on the work itself. Registra-
tion is necessary only as a prerequisite to a lawsuit, but if registered, the dura-
tion of the copyright is the life of the creator plus fifty years. Further, in the
copyright area, it is necessary to distinguish the physical object which embodies
the expression from the copyright which remains with the creator. If stipulated
in writing, the copyright itself may be purchased with the work. Infringement is
proved by establishing both substantial similarity and copying. 17 U.S.C. § 501
(1982).
The primary factor which distinguishes patentability from copyrightability is
the requirement of novelty in order to obtain a patent. The standard of novelty
is best delineated by the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). In Graham, the Court stated that
"innovation, advancement and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge
are inherent requisites in a patent system.., which by constitutional command-
ment must 'Promote the Progress of the Useful Arts.' " Id. For a discussion of
Graham, see 1 M.B. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.01[A] n.10; see also Falk & Wood-
bridge, Taxation of the Development and Sale of Patents, Trade Secrets and Copyrights,
N.J. LAw. 39 (1985) (comparing tax treatments).
Copyrights, on the other hand, require originality, which is defined by Pro-
fessor Nimmer to mean "independent creation," and not copied by others. 1
N.B. NIMMER, supra, § 2.01[A].
299. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 10(a), 94
Stat. 3015, 3028 (1978). The Copyright Act of 1976 was amended by the Com-
puter Software Act of 1980, in accordance with the recommendations of
CONTU (The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works). According to the definitional section of the Act, a "computer program"
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process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter," and
hence patentable,300 and what is an expression of an idea, and
therefore copyrightable. 30 ' A close reading of the district court
and the court of appeals decisions in a recent computer case illus-
trates the judiciary's confusion about the utility-expression di-
chotomy. 30 2 The fact that the courts have no clear concept of the
is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a com-
puter in order to bring about a certain result." Id.
300. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Section 101 provides: "Whoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id.
301. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976). The subject matter of a copyright is
delineated in this section. Section 102(b) goes on to enumerate that which is not
subjected to copyright. According to section 102(b), copyright protection does
not extend to an original work of authorship of "any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
Id. § 102(b). For the text of § 102, see supra note 89.
The expression/utility dichotomy inherent in the distinction between copy-
rights and patents was first discussed in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
The Baker Court stated that:
The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of
copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself.
The object of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The
former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if
it can be secured at all, by letters-patent.
Id. at 105; accord Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th
Cir. 1943) (chart used in recording industry not copyrightable), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 785 (1944).
302. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812
(E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033
(1984). In Apple, Apple Computer brought suit seeking an injunction to restrain
Franklin from using, copying, selling, or infringing Apple's registered copy-
rights on fourteen computer programs. 714 F.2d at 1244. The programs were
expressed in object code which is designed to be read by the machine. Id. at
1243. Apple charged that Franklin had stolen the logic and structure of their
systems. Id. at 1244.
The district court stated that Apple had failed to distinguish the form of the
work from its utilitarian purpose-the function and the form were merged be-
cause each work as a whole conveys information. 545 F. Supp. at 812, 823. The
court acknowledged that courts and commentators are divided on the treatment
of object codes, and noted that Apple's position was not "implausible." Id. at
818 n.8. However, the district court concluded that there was some doubt as to
the copyrightability of the computer programs at issue and denied Apple's re-
quest for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 812.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case. 714 F.2d at
1255. Although acknowledging the judicial confusion, the court said: "We be-
lieve that in the context before us, a program for an operating system, the line
must be a pragmatic one, which also keeps in consideration 'the preservation of
the balance between competition and protection reflected in the patent and
copyright laws.' " Id. at 1253 (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpalsian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)). If the idea merges with the ex-
pression so that the two are inseparable, then the expression may not be pro-
68
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss3/4
1986] COPYRIGHTS AND PATENTS 999
distinction between patentability and copyrightability reinforces
the conclusion that both are closely related. Yet, a creator's in-
ability to qualify his creation as an invention or useful design can
result in significant tax burdens. 303
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE I.R.C. SECTION 1235 INEQUITY
As indicated earlier in this article, a statement was made at
the Senate hearings on the Revenue Revision Act of 1950 which
noted that the proposed legislation to exclude both patents and
copyrights from the definition of a capital asset was "discrimina-
tory and arbitrary, and a great discouragement to the creative ge-
nius of the United States.30 4 Congress, by enacting a provision
which excluded only copyrights held by their creators from the
definition of capital assets, acted in an even more discriminatory
and arbitrary fashion.
Congress was able to delete "patents, designs, and inven-
tions" from its proposed bill3 0 5 because of its policy of fostering
inventions. 30 6 But this policy should not be enough of ajustifica-
tion to give patents preferential treatment while denying it to
copyrights. This is especially apparent when one examines the
irrationality of the classifications as delineated by Congress. Both
patents and copyrights are the result of the personal efforts of
their creator. Both advance the interest of mankind, one in the
area of the sciences and the other in the area of the arts. Both
benefit society; one perhaps by promoting life and the other by
making it more pleasurable to endure. Most significantly, both
tected by copyright. Id. The court held that if the idea of Apple's operating
program could be expressed in other various modes, then there was no merger
and Apple could protect its mode of expression with a copyright. Id. The court
also said that Apple sought only to protect by copyright the instructions imbed-
ded in the object program and not the method which instructs the computer to
perform it. Id.
303. It is significant to note that both parties to the Apple Compiler cases
were corporations. 714 F.2d at 1240. Because "holders" under section 1235
can only be individuals, corporations are excluded from the benefit of section
1235. See I.R.C. § 1235(b)(1), (2) (1982). Therefore, there is little incentive for
corporations to seek patent protection, especially if copyright law can protect
them as soon as the product comes into being and notice of copyright is affixed
to the product. For the full text of section 1235, see suipra note 6.
304. For a discussion of the statement, see supra note 215 and accompany-
ing text. See also S. WELL, BEAUTY AND THE BEAST (1983) (suggesting that Inter-
nal Revenue Code is "indifferent to the quality of art").
305. For a discussion of the deletion, see supra note 231 and accompanying
text.
306. For a discussion of Congress' policy, see spra note 231 and accompa-
nying text.
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the courts30 7 and the Internal Revenue Service (as recently as
1984) have acknowledged the substantial similarity between the
two classes of property.308 Moreover, the enactment of a propo-
sal whereby copyrighted property held by its creator would be
treated as a capital asset would clear away the uncertainties which
abound in the Tax Code for the artist.30 9 While the artist, under
the present tax structure, can be certain that, while in his own
hands, his creation is not a capital asset, he is left to ponder
whether the transfer of that asset is a sale, a right to future in-
come, or compensation. 310 He must also ponder whether he has
earned income or, instead, has transferred a piece of property
which does not yield him the classification of earned income. 31'
Furthermore, artists of other countries are entitled to a complete
or partial exemption from income tax. 31 2 The tax laws of Ireland
with respect to artists serve as a good example. In Ireland, the
work of painters, sculptors, writers and composers (but not per-
forming artists) is exempt from income tax if the work is found to
be "original and creative and of cultural or artistic merit." 313
(Remember Ulysses by James Joyce). Congress should again be
faced with proposed legislation which would entitle artists to the
same capital gain treatment already given to inventors.
One commentator has suggested another possible solution
which would be to revise section 1235 to allow both inventors and
307. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F.
Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464
U.S. 1033 (1984). For a discussion of the Apple case, see supra notes 301-02 and
accompanying text.
308. See G.C.M. 39252, 24 TAX NOTES 362 (1984); Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1
C.B. 26. For a further discussion of G.C.M. 39252, see supra notes 125-28 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of Rev. Rul. 60-226, see supra note
64 and accompanying text.
309. In the early seventies, friends of the artists proposed legislation similar
to section 1235 which would have provided capital gain treatment to authors,
artists, composers and their patrons. Congress, unfortunately, did not enact this
legislation. See H.R. REP. 696, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 1865
(1973).
310. For a discussion of the characterization of such a transfer, see supra
notes 113-56 and accompanying text.
311. See G.C.M. 39252, 24 TAx NOTES 362 (1984). For a discussion of
G.C.M. 39252, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
312. See Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Committee on IVavs and
Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 6117 (1973) (cited in Beghe, supra note 83, at 495)
(several countries grant such an exemption).
313. See Bouuaert, Fiscal Problems of Cultural Workers in the States of the Euro-
pean Economic Community, Commission of the European Community 24 (1977) (as
cited in Feld, supra note 17, at 16). Bouuaert discusses the tax treatment of art-
ists in Ireland and in other European countries. Id.
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authors capital gain treatment, but only to the extent of five times
the invested capital. 314 This proposal begins with the premise
that since both patents and copyrights result primarily from the
personal efforts of the creator rather than from investment of cap-
ital, the sale or exchange of either by the creator should be
treated as a capital transaction only to the extent of five times the
capital invested in the property or half of the gain, whichever is
less. This would only apply to amateurs. I.R.C. section 1221(3)
would be repealed.
However, this proposal's failure to distinguish "amateur"
from "professional" artists lessens its appeal. Furthermore, the
adjusted basis in the property would be withdrawn from the
amount realized before the creator is required to pay taxes on any
gain. The inventor would still have a significant edge over the
author, as the inventor's higher adjusted basis would entitle him
to a larger capital gain. The inventor would still be entitled to the
section 174 research and experimental expense deduction and to
the section 44F research and experimental expense credit. While
not a perfect answer, this proposal is certainly more equitable
than the present tax.
An argument has also been made for a revision of I.R.C. sec-
tion 170(e) which provides for deductions for charitable contribu-
tions. Such a revision could also apply to either a revision of
section 1235 or an amendment of section 1221(3).315 Currently,
when an author or artist donates a work to a charitable institution,
he can deduct only his actual cost. But when a collector donates a
work of art, she can deduct both her previously taxed income (i.e.,
her cost) plus the untaxed appreciation of the gift's value. Con-
gress could correct this inequity by permitting the artist to realize
capital gains tax treatment on the appreciation of his work by di-
viding the gain which the artist realized on the sale of his work
into two parts: the value which the artist added to the materials
through his personal efforts would be ordinary income; the ap-
preciation of the value of the work from the time of its creation to
the time of its disposition would be long-term capital gain.
To apply this appreciation concept generally, Congress need
only amend section 1221(3) to provide that, as of the date of com-
pletion, the artist must compute the value of his work as increased
by his personal efforts. If he then chooses to hold the property as
an investment, he would pay the necessary tax on the property,
314. See Note, supra note 24, at 1426-27.
315. See Feld, supra note 17, at 14-15.
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computed as if he had immediately sold the work. A realistic de-
termination of that value could be determined by: 1) the signed
and dated notice of copyright, and 2) if need be, by the Internal
Revenue Act Advisory Panel.31 6 Hence, the artist would not be
able to consider the value of his personal efforts as capital gain
upon a sale or exchange of his creation. This is in keeping with
Congress' policy announced in 1950.317 But, once the fair market
value of his piece is determined and the necessary tax paid, the
artist should be allowed to hold his own creation as an invest-
ment. Then, if he should sell this piece, he would realize long-
term capital gain for the amount that represents appreciation. To
a certain extent, the artist who places his work on sale does exer-
cise some control over those works which he believes to be of
better quality by pricing them higher than his other works. Why
should he not be able to treat those better pieces as investments?
Furthermore, Congress' policy on appreciation, as expressed
when it first enacted the capital gains treatment provisions in
1921, is that appreciation which accumulates over the years
should not be taxed as a lump sum in the year of realization. 318
As a final suggestion to resolve the inequity created by sec-
tion 1235, Congress could repeal that section altogether. As
stated before, both copyrights and patents are the result of the
personal efforts of the creator. Congress has said that the per-
sonal efforts of an artist should be taxed as ordinary income. Fur-
thermore, prior to the enactment of the Revenue Revision Act of
1950, Congress had discussed the possibility of excluding patents
as well as copyrights from the definition of capital assets.31 11 Even
with the repeal of section 1235, patents would still be afforded the
opportunity of long-term capital gain treatment under section
1231 of the Code. Although Congress has been reluctant to with-
316. The Internal Revenue Act Advisory Panel consists of a ten-person
panel of art experts appointed to help the Service determine whether realistic
appraisals of fair market value have been placed on the works of art. See Lerner,
supra note 17. For a detailed discussion of how the panel values the works, see
Donoghue, Art Appraisals and Vahlation for Federal Tax Purposes, in REPRESENTING
ARTISTS, COLLECTORS AND DEALERS 207, 212 (1983).
317. For a discussion of Congress' policy, see supra notes 203-34 and ac-
companying text.
318. For a discussion of Congress' policy towards appreciation, see supra
notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
319. For a discussion of the proposed exclusion of patents and copyrights
from the definition of capital assets, see supra notes 212-17 and accompanying
text.
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draw a preference once it has been granted,320 in light of the Defi-
cit Reduction Act of 1984 and the talk of broadbasing the tax, this
might well happen.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is readily apparent that there is a gross inequity in the In-
ternal Revenue Code between the discriminatory treatment given
to authors and the preferential one bestowed upon inventors.
Congress, in the legislative histories, indicated that its policy to-
wards artists is to take "loophole closing measures." 32 1 As evi-
dence of this, it is only necessary to look at the provisions enacted
which exclude artists from the preference of long-term capital
gain. On the other hand, Congress' stated policy towards inven-
tors is to foster inventions. Hence, we have sections 1235, 174
and 44F. Yet both of these intellectual properties, inventions and
copyrights, are very closely related as mandated in the Constitu-
tion, as found by the courts and as acknowledged by the Service.
Congress should also acknowledge this close relationship among
all of the creative geniuses of our country. The policy should be
to spark the creativity of all. Using Eulenberg's imagery, this
country needs as many Mozarts as it has mousetraps. Congress is
the only branch of government with the power to eradicate this
inequitable treatment. Even if it should choose to deny capital
gains treatment to both authors and inventors, this will indicate to
authors and artists that this country, while not preferring them, at
least no longer discriminates against them.
320. For a discussion of Congress' reluctance to withdraw a preference
once it has been given, see Blum, supra note 6.
321. For a further discussion of Congress' policy of taking "loophole clos-
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